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POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LAWS: DILEMMAS, CONCERNS
AND OPPORTUNITIES
KIRK J. NAHRA *
INTRODUCTION
T 7tHE campaign finance system presents many complex legal issues
make it an unusually difficult area for constitutional and policy
analysis. Because of Congress' high degree of self-interest in regulating
federal campaigns, the area may be one where Congress can be trusted
least.' Regulation of federal campaigns, however, is also an area where
Congress, as a group of successful, practical politicians, skilled in the
operations of the political marketplace, is arguably the most expert.
Concurrently, the election process constitutes an area where the judici-
ary, by constitutional design, may be the most removed from practical
political reality. Because of the importance of the campaign system to
many essential constitutional freedoms, any inhibition of political debate
must face intense constitutional scrutiny. Nevertheless, our political sys-
tem, as a democracy, must respond to trends in the political marketplace
that diverge from the notions of equality and equal access inherent in our
majoritarian representational ideal.2
Within this complex framework, Congress and the courts have strug-
gled in recent years with how best to deal with the issue of money in
politics. To date, this process of governmental thrust and judicial parry
has not proved especially successful because congressional efforts to limit
the influence of money in politics often have fallen victim to the Supreme
Court's powers of judicial review and the creativity of the participants in
the political marketplace. As a result, few of Congress' goals have been
achieved. The problem, however, is not a new one: throughout this cen-
tury, campaign financing regulations largely have failed to achieve de-
sired policy goals and, for the most part, have been easily avoided and
widely ignored by both the courts and federal candidates.'
The most notable recent attempt to regulate American campaign fi-
nancing, the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974
* Associate, Wiley, Rein & Fielding, Washington, D.C.; B.A. 1984, Georgetown
University; J.D. 1987, Harvard University.
1. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 13-26, at 1129 (2d ed. 1988) ("The
fear that a prevailing government might some day wield its power over political cam-
paigns so as to perpetuate its rule generates a commendable reluctance to invest govern-
ment with broad control over the conduct of political campaigns.").
2. Cf D. Adamany & G. Agree, Political Money: A Strategy for Campaign Financ-
ing in America 8 (1975) ("The first problem of [campaign finance] reform is to enable a
nation with a private property economy and, consequently, a massive inequality of indi-
vidual and institutional means to preserve opportunities for all its citizens to participate
equally or nearly equally in financing politics.").
3. See infra notes 32-102 and accompanying text.
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("FECA" or "the 1974 Act"),4 represented a comprehensive regulatory
scheme designed to remedy the flaws in the campaign process highlighted
by Watergate.' Unlike previous statutes, which were drafted so poorly
that they failed to place significant restraints on political spending,
FECA was eviscerated by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo,6 dem-
onstrating that good intentions and a receptive public mood do not al-
ways justify a significant imposition on first amendment freedoms. 7
The Buckley Court's response to FECA indicates some of the
problems confronting policy planners in this area. Congress' primary
goal in passing FECA was to minimize, as much as possible, the cor-
rupting influence of money in politics.8 This concern took the form of
mandatory disclosure of campaign financial activity,9 restrictions
designed to reduce campaign spending,' ° and stringent limits on what
candidates could spend and receive to equalize the spending among
candidates. 1
The Court in Buckley focused on different concerns. Despite the
strong public sentiment favoring a massive overhaul of the nation's cam-
paign financing process,12 the Court, perhaps without fully considering
the impact of its decision on the integrated scheme designed by Congress,
rejected many of the limitations built into FECA by Congress but al-
lowed the overall structure to stand.' 3 In the process, the Court focused
on the first amendment freedoms relevant to political campaigns, " dem-
onstrating little deference to congressional judgment. For example, it
largely ignored congressional concerns regarding massive disparities in
campaign spending. 5
4. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 2,
5, 18, 26, & 47 U.S.C.).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 89-99.
6. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
7. See Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of Political Speech, 1976 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 1, 42 (1976) ("[T]here is an irreducible core of individual liberty of free expres-
sion which cannot be made to yield to the emergencies that sometimes overtake the dem-
ocratic process.").
8. See, e.g., 120 Cong. Rec. 10,777 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Adams); 120 Cong. Rec.
8,209 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
9. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 432-434 (1982) (disclosure and reporting requirements for polit-
ical activities).
10. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
11. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,
§ 101(c)(1), 88 Stat. 1264 (1974).
12. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en bane) (per curiam), afJ'd
in part and rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
13. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1976) (per curiam). Aside from a brief
discussion relating to the public financing provisions, the Court did not address the issue
of whether its action in striking down several sections of the FECA meant that the whole
statute should be declared unconstitutional. See 424 U.S. at 254-55 (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting in part and concurring in part).
14. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (per curiam) (first amendment
protects political expression and political association).
15. See id. at 17 (Court rejected parts of statute where "interests served ... include
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As a result of the Court's actions in Buckley and subsequent cases, 6
the area of campaign financing, despite the existence of an extensive regu-
latory scheme, represents a region where few, if any, of the goals Con-
gress sought to achieve in the 1974 Act have been met. The expense of
running a campaign continues to rise dramatically,' public perceptions
of the political process continue to decline,"s and candidates continue to
rely on contributions from special interest groups.' 9
As Buckley illustrates, the Supreme Court has played an important
role in limiting Congress' flexibility to redesign the campaign finance sys-
tem, often using the first amendment as a shield to deflect congressional
action that infringes upon protected political activity. In a series of cases
that wins no prize for either logic or foresight, the Court has analyzed
various parts of FECA on an ad hoc basis and struck down several por-
tions of the statute on constitutional grounds without thoroughly consid-
ering the impact of its actions on the financing structure set up by
Congress.2° In these cases, the Court struggled with a number of polit-
ical issues-most notably, whether it should allow political reality to
enter its discussion of constitutional theory.2' Nevertheless, the Court
has failed to achieve a consistent jurisprudence on campaign financing
regulation.22 Some campaign spending limitations still apply to individu-
als and political organizations,23 while other limiting sections of FECA
have been struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional. 4
Although the Court may have reached the correct result in many of the
campaign finance cases, it may have done so for entirely the wrong
reasons.
In light of the confused Supreme Court jurisprudence, Congress has
open to it a limited number of approaches to effectuate the policy goals
underlying FECA.25 One of the purposes Congress had in enacting
FECA-that of lowering the amount of money spent on political cam-
paigns--clearly has been rejected by the Supreme Court as an illegitimate
restricting the voices of people and interest groups who have money to spend and reduc-
ing the overall scope of federal election campaigns.").
16. See infra text accompanying notes 103-210.
17. See infra note 150.
18. See generally S. Lipset & W. Schneider, The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor
and Government in the Public Mind (1983) (analyzing public opinion polls on business,
government and labor).
19. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 103-210.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 205-10.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 141-210.
23. See infra text accompanying note 126.
24. See infra text accompanying note 128.
25. See BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Cam-
paign Finance Reform, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 1045, 1045 (1985) ("Those who would continue
to try to reform the system by legislation confront not merely an unsympathetic political
climate but also a frustrating legal reality: the power of legislatures to purify campaign
finance practices is severely limited by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Constitution.").
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goal of campaign finance regulation.26 Another goal-that of equalizing
spending among federal candidates-was rejected by the Court in the
form embodied in FECA.27 Nevertheless, this second goal remains an
important and legitimate policy aspiration that can still be achieved if
future legislation reflects an appreciation of the Supreme Court's first
amendment concerns. At present, Congress, with the Court's apparent
blessing, continues to debate measures to limit the corrupting influence of
money in federal campaigns.2" This reform effort, however, has not yet
borne fruit.29
The goals of minimizing the threat of corruption, developing an open
political system under which candidates possess roughly equal resources,
and disclosing campaign activity to the voting public clearly represent
legitimate and desirable steps toward perfecting the operation of the cam-
paign machinery, but only if these policy goals can be reached within the
constitutional framework developed by the Supreme Court. Our policy-
makers should focus on how to use the tools of the campaign system to
build a regulatory scheme that best reflects political reality and an ade-
quate respect for first amendment principles, yet still demonstrates con-
cern with the impact of unequal campaign resources on the operation of
our democracy.
26. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-59 (1976) (per curiam).
27. See id. at 107-08.
28. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservation Political Action Comm.
("NCPAC"), 470 U.S. 480, 501 (1985) ("We are not quibbling over fine-tuning of pro-
phylactic limitations, but are concerned about wholesale restriction of clearly protected
conduct.").
29. In the past few years, numerous proposals to limit the role of political action
committees ("PACs") in the campaign finance system have received legislative attention,
but none have been enacted into law. In the last session of Congress, the Senate debated
two such proposals, demonstrating the degree of congressional concern with the role of
PACs in the political process. Unfortunately, the debate also demonstrated the partisan
posturing that threatens to thwart conscientious efforts at campaign finance reform.
The Senate passed an amendment to an unrelated bill, sponsored by Senators David
Boren and Barry Goldwater, 132 Cong. Rec. S11,291 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1986), that
would have limited the amounts that congressional candidates could receive from PACs.
See id. at S 11,311. Because this bill was seen widely as being aimed at Republican candi-
dates who as a group had shown a tendency to attract large sums in PAC contributions,
Senator Boschwitz sponsored another amendment which would have banned PAC con-
tributions to the national party committees. See id. at S 11,318. The Boschwitz amend-
ment would have greater impact on Democrats because the Democratic Party receives
more of its national party fund from PACs than do the Republicans. See id. This
amendment also passed, id. at S 11,350, but the bill itself went no further. Since then,
Senator Boren has reintroduced his bill in the 100th Congress, and Senate Majority
Leader Robert Byrd has indicated that campaign finance reform is a priority item on his
legislative agenda. See Gettinger, Reagan's Sway Over Congress Slipping Away, 44 Cong.
Q. 3109, 3113 (1986). Most recently, the Senate refused action on S.2, a bill designed to
limit campaign spending and the role of political action committees. This bill would have
set voluntary spending limits in Senate contests for those candidates who choose to accept
public funds and would restrict the aggregate amounts candidates could accept from
PACs. See 45 Cong. Q. 1332 (1987). Numerous attempts were made to stop a Republi-
can filibuster on this bill, see 45 Cong. Q. 2194 (1987), and finally further consideration of
the bill was put aside. See 45 Cong. Q. 2252 (1987).
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Historically, congressional attempts to regulate campaigns have failed
miserably.3" For several reasons, including congressional inability to put
aside its own political self-interest, the regulations simply have not ac-
complished their purposes. In fact, with the broad range of statutory
prohibitions masking the almost complete lack of actual control over the
campaign process, Congress, to some extent, has created the false appear-
ance of regulation.
This history provides some indication of the proper approach Congress
should take in drafting campaign finance regulations today. Clearly, in
light of the concerns regarding corruption in politics, some regulation of
the political campaign process is desirable and allowable. Given the first
amendment's general antagonism towards regulation of the political mar-
ketplace and the concern with Congress regulating its own means of be-
ing elected,31 the best campaign finance regulation approach is to limit
constraints to broad-sweeping requirements that serve the general inter-
est of informing voters, allowing full public debate on political issues, and
minimizing the risks of corruption. An ideal system would give legiti-
mate candidates a means of presenting their case to the voters, while
remaining relatively free from further congressional regulation.
The political parties offer the means through which these goals can be
achieved. Striking down the limitations on the ability of political parties
to support their candidates financially, as mandated by the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence, will reaffirm constitutional principles while assist-
ing the campaign finance structure in meeting the goals of Congress in
regulating this area. The parties offer a way of ensuring equality in cam-
paign spending while minimizing the extent of regulation.
This Article contends that under the Supreme Court's campaign fi-
nance jurisprudence, the restrictions on party spending in federal cam-
paigns violate the first amendment by limiting the political expression of
the political parties. In addition, it argues that the structure of the cam-
paign finance system and the policies embodied in FECA can be served
best by congressional action abolishing or diminishing these restrictions.
Such legislative action would expand the ability of political parties to
spend in support of their federal candidates and minimize congressional
interference with the political marketplace of ideas.
Part I of this Article traces the development of the federal campaign
finance law from early congressional regulations to the present system.
Part II addresses the Supreme Court's role in the development of the
current campaign scheme, focusing on how the Court's activities since
passage of the 1974 Act have affected the operations of the political sys-
tem. The Court has interpreted several fundamental policy and constitu-
tional issues inconsistently, yielding jurisprudence full of contradictions
30. See infra text accompanying notes 44-76.
31. See BeVier, Hands Off the Political Process, 10 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 11, 11
(1987) ("The First Amendment seems to tell legislators who are thinking about yet other
worlds to conquer to keep their hands off the political process.").
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and confusion. Despite the inconsistencies, a general view of the Court's
policies on campaign finance does emerge. Part III assesses the party
role in federal campaigns, briefly from a historical perspective, and then
through the party role in recent years. It is the historical and practical
role of the parties that allows the parties to sponsor candidates without
the threat of corruption posed by other political groups active in elec-
tions. Building on the jurisprudence discussion of Part II, Part IV ad-
dresses the constitutional and policy arguments for lifting the limitations
on political party spending on behalf of candidates. This Part assesses the
constitutional arguments in light of Supreme Court jurisprudence and
discusses the role that the parties can play in fulfilling the goals of Con-
gress in creating a comprehensive campaign finance system.
I. HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE SYSTEM
A. Case Study in Congressional Confusion
Despite the importance of political speech to the operation of our con-
stitutional democracy 32 and the protection provided such speech by the
first amendment,3 3 Congress has been involved in the regulation of polit-
ical campaigns since the turn of this century.34 The rationale for this
32. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (per curiam) ("In a republic where
the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among
candidates for office is essential .. "); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
777 (1978) (political speech "indispensible to decisionmaking in a democracy").
33. Fairly general agreement exists that a primary purpose of the first amendment is
to protect political speech. As the Court in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940),
stated:
The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution em-
braces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of
public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment....
Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must
embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable
the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.
Id. at 101-02 (footnote omitted).
Similarly, the Court, in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971), stated:
"it can hardly be doubted that the [first amendment] guarantee has its fullest and most
urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office." This speech
is important because "speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is
the essence of self-government." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). See
also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976) ("political belief and association constitute
the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) ("Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifica-
tions of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established
by our Constitution."); see generally BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech:
An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 299 (1978).
34. See infra notes 44-84 and accompanying text; see also Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S.
355, 366 (1932) (Congress constitutionally empowered "to enact the numerous require-
ments as to procedure and safeguards [relating to elections] which experience shows are
necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved"); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110
U.S. 651, 658 (1884) (republican government "must have the power to protect the elec-
tions on which its existence depends from violence and corruption"). See generally
Fleishman, Freedom of Speech and Equality of Political Opportunity: The Constitutional-
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regulation is clear: because of the importance of campaigns and political
dialogue, Congress may take certain steps to insure that elections meet
some predetermined standard that best facilitates the operation of
democracy.35
Given the "crucial role [of political speech and association] in enabling
self-government to work,",36 an inherent tension exists between allowing
the political process to proceed without interference from Congress and
allowing Congress to act to improve the workings of the political process.
The area of campaign finance is unique because, in the campaign context,
"both the first amendment and the law with which it is in potential con-
flict are designed to accomplish the same broad purpose, namely to ad-
vance the interests of democratic self-government."' '37 Congressional
action to "advance" the first amendment in this area poses considerable
risk as the "ins have a way of wanting to make sure the outs stay out.",
38
Given these concerns, a minimum of regulation is preferable, as "[t]he
greatest campaign reform law ever enacted was the First Amendment
"39
Historically, Congress intended to develop stringent regulation of cam-
paigns. Until the early 1970s, however, the political process continued to
run freely, as congressional efforts to regulate the operations of the fed-
eral campaign system did not prove effective.' Congress had imple-
mented a wide range of statutes regulating campaign finance, but these
statutes were designed and enforced in such a way that, in effect, the
process was largely free from regulation, with the statutes serving pri-
marily as an unused safety valve.4 1 The ineffectiveness of these laws led
ity of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 51 N.C.L. Rev. 389, 399-404 (1973)
(congressional authority to regulate elections).
35. See Fleishman, The 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments. The
Shortcomings of Good Intentions, 1975 Duke L.J. 851, 864 (1975). From the earliest ef-
forts to regulate the financing of federal elections, a purpose of the laws ostensibly has
been to promote an active democracy. See United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 575
(1957) ("As the historical background [of the Tillman Act] indicates, its aim was not
merely to prevent the subversion of the integrity of the electoral process. Its underlying
philosophy was to sustain the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a
democracy for the wise conduct of government.").
36. Fleishman, supra note 35, at 863.
37. Redish, Campaign Spending Laws and the First Amendment, 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
900, 907 (1971).
38. J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 106 (1980).
39. See Bolton, Constitutional Limitations on Restricting Corporate and Union Polit-
ical Speech, 22 Ariz. L. Rev. 373, 374 n.3 (1980) (quoting Professor Ralph K. Winter's
oral argument in Buckley). Accordingly, the "gravity of these problems argues for great
reticence in tampering with the election process." Rosenthal, Campaign Financing and
the Constitution, 9 Harv. J. on Legis. 359, 360 (1972).
40. See H. Alexander, Money in Politics 183 (1972) ("[A]s quickly as restrictive laws
were passed, new methods of getting, giving, and spending came into existence."); A.
Heard, The Costs of Democracy 344 (1960) ("No other nation has attempted so much
... yet the over-all result is regularly declared by politicians and observers alike to be a
failure."); see also infra text accompanying notes 44-71. See generally H. Alexander,
supra, at 183-97; A. Heard, supra, at 344-70.
41. See infra notes 44-71 and accompanying text.
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to doubts about Congress' capacity to regulate campaigns effectively4"
and to concerns about the sincerity of incumbent politicians in regulating
their political livelihood.43
From Congress' first efforts to regulate the financing of federal cam-
paigns, a pattern emerged that would repeat itself in all subsequent ef-
forts to reform the financing of the nation's campaigns. Congress' first
step in the construction of a federal campaign finance system was the
Tillman Act of 1907,44 prohibiting corporate contributions to federal
campaigns. 45 The Tillman Act was a part of Theodore Roosevelt's pro-
gressive program to minimize the influence of large corporate contribu-
tors in campaigns-a concern that has persisted to this day.4 6 This Act
42. See BeVier, supra note 25, at 1078 ("The historical ineptitude of legislatures at-
tempting electoral reform suggests that deferrence to legislative 'expertise' is
unwarranted.").
43. According to Professor BeVier's article on the first amendment and campaign
finance reform,
even if the first amendment theoretically permits or even requires Congress to
regulate free political expression in the name of competing goals such as equal-
ity, there is little evidence to suggest that Congress can be trusted to "do it
better," and therefore that the Court should defer to Congress' judgment. To
the contrary, there is reason to believe that Congress is systematically untrust-
worthy and a proven incompetent at genuinely reforming the political process.
BeVier, supra note 25, at 1080.
44. Ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907).
45. See id. The Act, still on the books, has faced strong challenge in recent years. See
Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 107 S. Ct. 616, 626-27
(1986); see also infra notes 170-73. While not formally addressing the constitutionality of
this statute, the Court has hinted at the outcome of such a challenge. See First Nat'l
Bank v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 821 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) ("If the corporate iden-
tity of the speaker makes no difference, all the Court has done is to reserve the formal
interment of the Corrupt Practices Act and similar state statutes for another day."). In
United States v. Congress of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106 (1948), the Court avoided decid-
ing the constitutionality of the restrictions on corporate and union giving by deciding that
the indictment at issue did not charge acts within the scope of the Corrupt Practices Act.
The Court's opinion was a narrow one, explicitly limited to the facts of that case. See id.
at 123-24. Four members of the Court, Justices Rutledge, Black, Douglas, and Murphy,
argued that the section, as applied, was unconstitutional. See id. at 129-30 (Rutledge, J.,
concurring). The constitutional question has survived until today. See Bolton, supra
note 39, at 373 ("Few constitutional issues have been so extensively debated without a
resolution by the Supreme Court as the validity of federal restrictions on corporate and
union political activity.").
46. Corporate spending in federal campaigns "raises the prospect that resources
amassed in the economic marketplace may be used to provide an unfair advantage in the
political marketplace." Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 107
S. Ct. 616, 628 (1986). According to the Court, the Tillman Act ban on contributions is
"meant to ensure that competition among actors in the political arena is truly competi-
tion among ideas." Id. While "the special characteristics of the corporate structure re-
quire particularly careful regulation," Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to
Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209-10 (1982), the Court rejected the application of this
statute to Massachusetts Citizens for Life, a nonstock, nonprofit corporation founded to
protect Pro-Life principles, because "[t]he resources it has available are not a function of
its success in the economic marketplace, but its popularity in the political marketplace."
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 107 S. Ct. at 628.
For a historical discussion of the passage of the Tillman Act, see generally E. Sikes,
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did not meet its goal, however, as it "hardly dented corporate influence
on federal elections."'4 7 This cycle, of lofty goals of minimizing the influ-
ence of money in campaigns combined with statutes ineffective in imple-
menting these goals, repeats itself throughout the history of campaign
finance regulation.48
The next development in campaign finance regulation was the passage
of the first law requiring disclosure of spending and contributions in fed-
eral elections. Following the presidential election in 1904, the National
Publicity Law Association was founded to urge passage of an election
disclosure law,4 9 which Congress eventually passed in 1910.50 Again,
though the goals behind these provisions were admirable,"1 the legisla-
State and Federal Corrupt Practices Legislation 190-92 (1928); Bolton, supra note 39, at
375-81. The Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159-60 (1947), amended by
18 U.S.C. § 610 (1952) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976)), permanently ex-
tended the Tillman Act to cover union activity as well as corporate involvement.
47. Bicks & Friedman, Regulation of Federal Election Finance: A Case of Misguided
Morality, 28 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 975, 995 (1953). See also A. Heard, supra note 40, at 129-35
(describing corporate efforts to evade the Act's restrictions); Lambert, Corporate Political
Spending and Campaign Finance, 40 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1033, 1037 (1965) (Act was a "less
than effective[ ] response to the Republican party's dominance by powerful business inter-
ests."); Comment, The Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate and Union Cam-
paign Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 148, 148 (1974) (no reported
convictions for illegal corporate contributions had been obtained from 1907 to 1973).
48. See generally Lucas, The Strength of Ten: Three-Quarters of a Century of Purity
in Election Finance, 51 Nw. U.L. Rev. 675, 683-88 (1957) (legislative attempts to regulate
campaign financing by several states).
49. See H. Alexander, supra note 40, at 199; L. Overacker, Presidential Campaign
Funds 19-22 (1946).
50. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822 (1910) (requiring disclosure following
elections), amended by Act of Aug. 19, 1911, ch. 33, § 2, 37 Stat. 25, 26-29 (1911) (re-
quiring disclosure before the election). These provisions were incorporated in the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act at ch. 368, §§ 241-256, 43 Stat. 1053 (1925). For a history of these
bills, see E. Sikes, supra note 46, at 195-202.
51. A number of scholars have argued that an effective disclosure law represents the
best method of regulating campaigns, both in terms of the effectiveness of campaign laws
and the benefit to the public. See eg., J. Pollock, Party Campaign Funds 262-63 (1926);
Bicks & Friedman, supra note 47, at 999-1000. For the most part, campaign disclosure
laws have avoided successful consitutional challenges. In Buckley v. Vaeo, 424 U.S. I
(1976), for example, the Supreme Court rejected most of the allegations in this area. See
id. at 84 & n.113.
The primary concern with disclosure laws is that they might prevent the candidates of
minor parties from raising funds. See id at 71 (minor parties argued that disclosure
requirements would have a chilling effect on the number of contributions made because
supporters would be fearful of public exposure); see also Redish, supra note 37, at 924-25
(arguing that "disclosure requirements present a serious conflict with the... first amend-
ment right of anonymity"). In Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 548 (1934), the
Court, in dictum, seemed to reject the challenges to disclosure laws. Since Burroughs,
however, the Court has expanded the associational rights guaranteed by the first amend-
ment in the context of challenges to other types of disclosure laws. See Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1960) (holding an Arkansas statute compelling a teacher to file an
affidavit listing every organization he belonged or contributed to within the past five years
unconstitutional because it impaired the teacher's right of free association); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (holding the Alabama court could not compel the
NAACP to reveal names and addresses of Alabama members and agents because mem-
bers' right to pursue their lawful private interests is protected by the fourteenth amend-
1987]
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tion lacked significant effect. 52
In 1925 Congress passed the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925
("FCPA")," which was intended to serve as a comprehensive regulation
of the financing of federal campaigns. 4 This Act, with some additions,55
remained the primary campaign finance law until its repeal in 1971. 16
The Federal Corrupt Practices Act was so "riddled with loopholes, 5 7
however, that the exceptions "pull[ed] the teeth" of the limitations.5"
The problems with the FCPA were numerous. It set "impossibly low
limits on campaign expenditures ... , then allowed them to be ignored
through the fiction that candidates were officially ignorant of, and thus
not legally responsible for, most of the money spent in their cam-
paigns."'59 In addition, the Hatch Act,6° part of the comprehensive fed-
eral campaign finance scheme, simultaneously allowed a series of gifts to
ment). The Buckley Court nevertheless rejected a facial challenge to campaign disclosure
statutes as applied to minor parties on the ground that the governmental interest in dis-
closure outweighed the alleged burden on parties' first amendment rights. See Buckley,
424 U.S. at 70-72. The Court, however, did leave open the possibility that a showing of
substantial and serious injury would support a finding of infringement of first amendment
associational rights. See id. at 70-72. No successful associational arguments have been
made yet to limit the reach of disclosure laws as applied to the major parties.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 57-71.
53. Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, §§ 301-19, 43 Stat. 1053, 1070-74 (1925)
(codified at scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.), repealed by Federal Election Campaign Act,
Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 405, 86 Stat. 20 (1971).
54. For the most part, the FCPA reenacted and codified existing campaign law. A
major addition consisted of broadening the prohibition on corporate contributions from
"money" to "anything of value." See Fleishman, supra note 34, at 403.
55. The primary changes involved the extension of the ban on corporate contributions
to labor unions, see Hatch Political Activities Act, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939) (codified
at scattered sections of 5 & 18 U.S.C.) and the 1940 amendments to the Hatch Act, ch.
640, 54 Stat. 767 (1940), which primarily prohibit active political participation in federal
campaigns by federal employees. In United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n
of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), the Court upheld the Hatch Act provisions,
stating that "plainly identifiable acts of political management and political campaigning
on the part of federal employees may constitutionally be prohibited." Id. at 567.
The Hatch Act also limits the amount of contributions to a single committee, see
Hatch Act, ch. 640, § 6, 54 Stat. 767, 772 (1940) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)
(1976)), and limited the amount that could be spent by either an interstate political com-
mittee or one that is a branch of a national committee. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645,
62 Stat. 723 (1948), repealed by Campaign Communications Act, Pub. L. No. 92-225,
§ 204, 86 Stat. 3, 10 (1972). These provisions fell victim to the same loopholes that con-
fronted the prior attempts to limit spending and contributions. See infra notes 57-71.
56. Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, §§ 301-19, 43 Stat. 1053, 1070-74 (1925)
(codified at scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.), repealed by Federal Election Campaign Act,
Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 405, 86 Stat. 20 (1971).
57. See generally G. Thayer, Who Shakes the Money Tree? American Campaign Fi-
nancing Practices From 1789 to the Present 63 (1973).
58. Bicks & Friedman, supra note 47, at 988. See also G. Thayer, supra note 57, at
62-63 ("In keeping with the temper of the times, the [Corrupt Practices Act] was more
show than substance .... ).
59. See G. Jacobson, Money in Congressional Elections 164-65 (1980); see also Red-
ish, supra note 37, at 905 ("Though these laws appear to place stringent limitations upon
campaign finance, congressional committees and commentators are in general agreement
that the laws have been wholly ineffective in accomplishing their stated purpose.").
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different committees organized for the benefit of the same candidate, and
placed no limits on the number of committees or contributions.6 The
FCPA did not apply to political committees supporting federal candi-
dates in only one state.62 In addition, because of the Supreme Court's
ruling in Newberry v. United States,6 3 the disclosure provisions of the
FCPA did not apply to primary elections or state nominating
conventions. 64
As a result, the FCPA "was neither enforced nor enforceable. ' 65 The
loophole permitting creation of multiple committees and other flaws of
the reporting system 66 rendered the remaining disclosure provisions
"practically useless.",67 Enforcement of the statute was "farcical," 68 as,
despite flagrant violations, no prosecutions were ever brought under the
FCPA.69 The overall result of the FCPA's regulatory system was that its
"limitations [did] not limit and [its] prohibitions [did] not prohibit."70
Despite the fact that the FCPA "was an almost total failure at achieving
its stated purpose,, 71 the system continued basically unchanged until the
Federal Election Campaign Act was enacted in 197 1.72 Therefore, cam-
paign spending went virtually unregulated during this period.
60. Hatch Act, ch. 640, § 6, 54 Stat. 767, 772 (1940) (current version at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(a) (1976)).
61. See Note, Statutory Regulation of Political Campaign Funds, 66 Harv. L. Rev.
1259, 1264-66 (1953).
62. See 2 U.S.C. § 241(c) (1946) (repealed 1976); 18 U.S.C. § 591 (Supp. 1952) (re-
pealed 1980).
63. 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
64. In Newberry, because the Court could not conclude "that authority to control
party primaries or conventions for designating candidates was bestowed on Congress by
the grant of power to regulate the manner of holding elections," id. at 258, it overturned
the convictions for exceeding the spending limits imposed on primary elections. See id.
Because Newberry "was widely construed to have invalidated all federal corrupt practices
legislation relating to nominations," United States v. Congress of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S.
106, 114 (1948), the 1925 Corrupt Practices Act did not apply to primary elections or
party nominating conventions. Newberry was overruled, sub silentio, in United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 317-20 (1941).
65. G. Jacobson, supra note 59, at 164.
66. See L. Overacker, supra note 49, at 35-36; Note, supra note 61, at 1264-66. When
candidates created multiple committees to avoid the contribution and spending limits, the
resulting proliferation of committee names affiliated with a single candidate made it virtu-
ally impossible for the disclosure provisions to operate effectively. See Adamany &
Agree, supra note 2, at 86-88 (discussing the inadequate operation of reporting require-
ments and the lack of monitoring).
67. J. Pollock, supra note 51, at 194.
68. See Bicks & Friedman, supra note 47, at 991.
69. See H. Penniman and R. Winter, Campaign Finances: Two Views of the Political
and Constitutional Implications 6 (1971). Senate campaigns in 1970 spent as much as
eighty times the amount specified in the FCPA. See id. at 8. Similarly, all presidential
candidates after 1940 exceeded their limits. See iL at 23. Accordingly, setting limits in
this area proved "quite futile." J. Pollock, supra note 51, at 142.
70. Overacker, Presidential Campaigns Funds; 1944, 39 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 899, 924
(1945).
71. BeVier, supra note 25, at 1079.
72. Federal Election Campaign Act, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 405, 86 Stat. 20 (1971).
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During the late 1960s and early 1970s, commentators and politicians
devoted extensive attention to the problem of money in politics, focusing
on the ineffectiveness of existing law. 3 Much of the discussion centered
on the massive loopholes in the FCPA. 4 The parties to the debate ex-
pressed widespread distrust of the existing law and an almost universal
recognition that "the existing law amount[ed] to little more than no law
at all."71 5 Congress was involved in much of this debate, although no
significant changes occurred during the 1960S.
76
Finally, after extensive debate,7 7 Congress passed the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (the "1971 Act"),7" which replaced the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act as the governing body of federal law regulating the
campaign process. The 1971 Act imposed a number of significant restric-
tions on federal campaign spending, including requirements for low-cost
political advertising,79 ceilings on media expenditures by candidates,"
limitations on a candidate's personal expenditures,8 ' a strengthening of
the prohibitions on corporate and labor union contributions, 2 a repeal of
existing contribution and expenditure limits, 3 and mandatory disclosure
of campaign contributions.8 4
73. See H. Alexander, supra note 40, at 201-29; Fleishman, supra note 34, at 389-9 1.
74. See Lobel, Federal Control of Campaign Contributions, 51 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 22-33
(1967).
75. Robinson, Revision of Federal Law on Campaign Finances, 30 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
328, 328 (1961). "Perhaps no major national law with so many loopholes and so little
enforcement has survived as long as have the election finance statutes. Evasion in spirit,
if not in letter, has long been the rule. Apparent violators have seldom been bothered with
legal proceedings." Id. at 337.
76. See Robinson, supra note 75, at 347-57 (discussing congressional proposals during
this period).
77. For a discussion of the debate and legislative history of the FECA of 1971, see
Berry & Goldman, Congress and Public Policy: A Study of the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971, 10 Harv. J. on Legis. 331, 337-56 (1973).
78. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
2, 18, & 47 U.S.C.).
79. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 103, 86 Stat. 3, 4
(1972) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982)).
80. Id. § 104, 86 Stat. at 5.
81. Id. § 203, 86 Stat. at 9, amended by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974), repealed by Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 201, 90 Stat. 475, 496 (1976)
(repealing 18 U.S.C. § 608).
82. Id. § 205, 86 Stat. at 10, repealed by Federal Election Campaign Act Amend-
ments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 201, 90 Stat. 475, 496 (1976) (repealing 18 U.S.C.
§ 610).
83. Id. § 207, § 405, 86 Stat. at 11, 20.
84. Id. § 302-04, 86 Stat. at 12-15; see H. Alexander, supra note 40, at 305-12; Fleish-
man, supra note 34, at 393-97; Note, Campaign Finance Reform: Pollution Control for
the Smoke-Filled Rooms?, 23 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 631, 662-66 (1972). Professor Fleish-
man discusses the Presidential Campaign Fund Act, tit. VIII of the Revenue Act of 1971,
85 Stat. 562-74, which provides for the tax check-off system for the Presidential Election
Campaign Fund. See Fleishman, supra note 34, at 397-99. The tax check-off is the por-
tion of the federal income tax return that gives the individual taxpayer the option to
donate one dollar, or two dollars for a joint return, to presidential campaigns. See id. at
397. This law did not become fully effective until the public financing provisions of the
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The constitutionality of these provisions was questioned extensively
subsequent to their passage.85 The 1971 Act, however, was not chal-
lenged in court, primarily because the subsequent financing abuses of
Watergate demonstrated the need for further campaign finance reform. 6
One commentator posited that despite its brief existence, the 1971 Act
may have contributed to President Nixon's resignation," as the cam-
paign reports filed pursuant to the 1971 Act's disclosure requirements led
to many of the Watergate revelations.
88
The repercussions of Watergate, not the least of which was the public
demand for congressional action to remedy the obvious flaws in the cam-
paign system, prompted Congress to reform the financing structure of
federal campaigns.89 By contrast with the ineffectual Corrupt Practices
Act and the stop-gap 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act, the 1974
FECA amendments represented "the most ambitious and thoroughgoing
reforms of the election process ever enacted by Congress."'90 Because of
the public concern with the fairness and honesty of the campaign process
after Watergate, Congress enacted FECA as an "attempt to give practi-
cal vent to the shame and guilt aroused by the whole sorry spectacle."'"
Although the public clearly demanded some kind of reform in light of
Watergate, the exact nature of the reform remained vague and became
the subject of much debate. One option was a comprehensive reorganiza-
tion and regulation of the campaign process to restore public confidence
and promote fairness and honesty in the campaigns.9 2 Another ap-
1974 amendments became effective, as the Act did not provide for any means of distribut-
ing the funds collected by the tax check-off.
85. See R. Winter, Watergate and the Law 25 (1974) (the 1971 FECA was "greeted
by constitutional authorities with comments varying from 'would seem to violate the
First Amendment' to 'flatly unconstitutional'" (footnotes omitted)); see also Staats, Im-
pact of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 425 Annals 98 (1976) (discussing
operation of the 1971 FECA during its brief existence); see generally Biden, Public Fi-
nancing of Elections: Legislative Proposals and Constitutional Questions, 69 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 1 (1974) (discussing proposed reforms to campaign financing); Fleishman, supra
note 34 (discussing constitutionality of election campaign reform legislation); Rosenthal,
supra note 39 (discussing constitutional challenges to campaign financing reforms).
86. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 839-40 & nn.38-40 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc)
(per curiam), affd in part and rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (citing exam-
ples of problems in campaign finance); R. Winter, supra note 85, at 36-48 (describing the
"dirty tricks" that occurred in the 1972 campaign).
87. Fleishman, supra note 35, at 851-52.
88. Id. at 851.
89. See S. Rep. No. 689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 5587, 5590 [hereinafter Senate Report] ("Americans are looking
to Congress for comprehensive, effective reform, not for halfway measures that only
reach a small part of the problem .... ); Powe, Mass Speech and the Newer First Amend-
ment, 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 243, 250 ("With too much evidence that wide-spread corrup-
tion was causing an erosion in public confidence in government, Congress acted.").
90. Polsby, supra note 7, at 2.
91. Fleishman, supra note 35, at 852.
92. The D.C. Circuit may have best expressed this view: "['%V]e have arrived at the
comprehensiveness of the present Acts through the failure of piecemeal regulation to
preserve the integrity of federal elections." Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 907 app.
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proach, building on earlier scholarship, was to develop an effective public
disclosure system for campaign contributions and expenditures. This ap-
proach would permit the proper operation of the democratic process by
respecting the first amendment rights of campaign contributors and al-
lowing contribution data to become a source of information to the voting
public.93 The latter approach, however, allows the first amendment to
work most effectively by publicizing the sources of campaign donations
while minimizing the necessary regulation of the political process.
As a result of the tremors Watergate sent throughout the country, the
final form of the 1974 amendments tilted toward a more extensive regula-
tion of the campaign structures.94 Accordingly, "the 1974 amendments
[made] running for federal office a regulated industry, with all the famil-
iar trappings-reports to file, forms to fill out, regulations to observe, and
a regulatory commission to live with.""
The 1974 Act, as passed, targeted four primary goals: disclosure of
campaign financial activity, prevention of corruption stemming from the
influence of large contributors, reduction of campaign spending so as to
bring about an equality of spending among candidates for federal office,
and invigoration of the election process.96 When passed originally by the
Senate, FECA also had included public financing for Senate and House
races.9 7 Although the Senate viewed these provisions as an essential in-
gredient of the proposal, 98 they were eliminated in conference. 99
After passage, many commentators criticized FECA for its protection
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (per curiam), afid in part and rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
(per curiam).
93. See J. Pollock, supra note 51, at 263 ("The elimination from the laws of a large
number of 'don'ts' and the insertion of an effective publicity 'do' will contribute more
toward raising the level of political practices than all the penal legislation on the books.");
Bicks & Friedman, supra note 47, at 999-1000; Lederle, Political Committee Expenditures
and the Hatch Act, 44 Mich. L. Rev. 294 passim (1945); Note, supra note 61, at 1262.
The Supreme Court itself noted that "informed public opinion is the most potent of all
restraints upon misgovernment." Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250
(1936).
94. See Polsby, supra note 7, at 1 (FECA is "in a sense a major legacy of [Nixon's]
administration. Just as the growing malaise and restlessness of the electorate through the
Vietnam period made sweeping reform of federal elections possible, Watergate and its
extraordinary transpirations made it necessary.").
95. Polsby, supra note 7, at 4.
96. See Senate Report, supra note 89, at 5590; H.R. Rep. No. 1239, 93d Cong. 2d
Sess. (1974); see also Wertheimer, Campaign Finance Reform: The Unfinished Agenda,
486 Annals 86, 87 (1986) ("The goals [of the 1974 Act] were to end secrecy in campaign
financing, to limit the influence of large contributions, to enable candidates of modest
means to seek office without becoming beholden to campaign donors, and to increase
competition in the political process.").
97. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1438, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 109-10 (1974), reprinted in
Legislative History of Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 1053-54
(1977).
98. See Senate Report, supra note 89, at 5590-91. According to the committee report,
"it is clear to us that contribution and expenditure limits which would check excessive
influence of great wealth cannot be effectively and fairly implemented without a compre-
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of incumbents."1° To many, Congress appeared to be responding to the
pressure presented by the Watergate disclosures with legislation that
looked good to the public but that actually increased protection for in-
cumbents. 101 Criticism focused on the spending limits imposed on House
and Senate campaigns, which might prevent lesser-known challengers
from publicizing their campaigns, and on the contribution limits, which
might prevent these same challengers from raising a base of funds to run
their campaigns. 102
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESENT DAY CAMPAIGN
FINANCE SYSTEM
A. The Supreme Court's Decision in Buckley v. Valeo
With congressional goals clearly presented in FECA, the Supreme
Court was confronted almost immediately with a major challenge to the
wide-ranging statute. 10 3 Pursuant to the statute's expedited review provi-
sions,' O a diverse group of political actors, including Senator James
Buckley, liberal activist Stewart Mott, the American Civil Liberties
Union, and Eugene McCarthy, brought suit. 0 The action challenged
virtually every provision of FECA on first amendment, equal protection,
and other grounds. 10 6
The Supreme Court faced a wide range of problems in Buckley. The
first amendment issues raised in the case had never before been presented
hensive system of public campaign financing." Id. at 5591; see also id. at 5617 (statement
of Sen. Pell).
99. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1438, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 109-10 (1974), reprinted in
Legislative History of Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 1053-54
(1977).
100. See Broder, The "Reform" Will Help Incumbents, The Wash. Post, May 28, 1975,
at A18; Buchanan, The Ripoff Named Reform, Newsweek, May 6, 1975, at 14; Broder,
Reforming Campaign Reform, The Wash. Post, April 30, 1975, at A15; Alexander, The
Panic to Reform, Newsweek, January 20, 1975, at 84; Will, The Limits of Campaign
Spending Limitations, The Wash. Post, January 14, 1975 at A15.
101. As Professor Winter noted, "[t]he Congress that attempted to impose expenditure
limits on House and Senate candidates [in the 1974 Act] appropriated more for franked
mail (used principally before elections) than challengers spent on all campaign activities."
Winter, Changing Concepts of Equality: From Equality Before the Law to the Welfare
State, 1979 Wash. U.L.Q. 741, 752 (1979). Franked mail is "official" mail that is sent out
by members of Congress without charge. See 39 U.S.C. §§ 3210-19 (1982).
102. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
103. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
104. Because of questions regarding the constitutionality of the Act's provisions, Con-
gress inserted a provision that allowed for quick resolution of these issues. See 2 U.S.C.
§ 437h (1982); see also California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S.
182, 188-89 (1981) (§ 437h enacted to provide alternative method of obtaining expedited
review of constitutional challenges to FECA).
105. See Brief for Appellants at 14-24, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (describing
appellants and their interest in the case). For the purposes of this Article, it is important
to note that the plaintiffs were primarily independent of the traditional party structure.
106. See Brief for Appellants at 27-36, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (summariz-
ing argument).
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directly to the Court."0 7 In addition, the Court confronted many other
difficult issues in Buckley, few of which were easily resolved from either a
constitutional or a policy perspective. 10 8 Furthermore, the nature and
extent of the Watergate scandal presented a major crisis for the constitu-
tional system, producing a "political climate in which wholesale invalida-
tion of the 1974 reforms could have brought about widespread distrust of
the Court as an institution." 'o 9 Given the significant limitations imposed
on political spending and activity by FECA, however, blind acceptance
of the statute's flaws in exchange for its soothing effect on the public
would have involved equally undesirable effects.1 0 Thus, the Court was
confronted with balancing difficult issues while attempting to allay public
fears of political corruption; in trying to do both, the Court achieved an
uneasy compromise with which it has continued to struggle.
The lower appellate court decision in Buckley favored the political
process reformers, upholding almost every provision of FECA.I The
Supreme Court, in an extensive per curiam opinion, however, poked a
107. See Note, The Constitutionality of Limitations on Individual Political Campaign
Contributions and Expenditures: The Supreme Court's Decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 25
Emory L.J. 400, 407 (1976) (Until Buckley, "the federal courts had not rulcd directly on
whether limitations placed on individual political expenditures and contributions uncon-
stitutionally infringed an individual's First Amendment freedoms."). This absence of
constitutional decisions is easily explained, as "those subjected to the campaign finance
restrictions that were in effect prior to enactment of the FECA had lacked the incentive
to press their constitutional claims, since the restrictions either could be readily avoided
or had been emasculated by courts." BeVier, supra note 25, at 1053.
108. See Brief for the Attorney General as Appellee and for the United States as ami-
cus curiae, in Buckley, at 7 n.3 ("Standing alone, each of the constitutional issues
presented here is of paramount importance to the future governance of the United States;
with these issues combined in one lawsuit, the task of adjudication pressed upon this
Court is one of enormous proportions.").
109. Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The Constitutionality of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act Amendments of 1974, 1977 Wis. L. Rev. 323, 327.
110. One commentator has stated that
[t]he other extreme-rationalization of the legislation's shortcomings in the
name of a public response to Watergate-is equally undesirable. The character
of political financing is far too important to the long-term survival and healthy
functioning of democracy for the Court to allow the passions and pressures of
the moment to perpetuate what appear to be seriously faulty modes of dealing
with it.
Fleishman, supra note 35, at 853. See also BeVier, supra note 25, at 1090 ("The fact is
that had the Court yielded to the reformer's insistence that it relax its customary first
amendment vigilance, the gain to political equality would have been highly problematic,
if not wholly fortuitous. The loss of political liberty, on the other hand, would have been
swift and certain.").
111. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (per curiam), aft'd
in part and rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). In Buckley, the D.C. Circuit
"received the amendments' mass of strictures and obligations without a single note of
skepticism. On the contrary, it wrote as though the reforms were all but constitutionally
required." Polsby, supra note 7, at 14. For elaborations of the views of some of the
majority judges hearing the Buckley appeal, see Leventhal, Courts and Political Thickets,
77 Colum. L. Rev. 345 (1977); Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First
Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 609 (1982); Wright,
Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 Yale L.J. 1001 (1976).
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large hole in the structure of the finance system designed and envisioned
by Congress. 1 2 Faced with the dramatic problems created by the nature
of the case, the Court was forced to reconcile the concerns created by the
Watergate scandal with the constitutional concerns present in any mas-
sive reordering of the political system. As such, Buckley represents not
so much a consistent, constitutional opinion as a political decision,
designed to pacify the cries for reform while maintaining full protection
for basic constitutional freedoms." 3 As a political decision, the Court cut
some constitutional corners in trying to reach a pragmatic middle
ground, yet it also, at times, ignored aspects of the political reality that
had mandated the efforts at reform." 14
In Buckley, the Court confronted several threshold issues. The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia had treated the spending of
money in campaigns as conduct, rather than speech," 5 which subjected
the law to the lesser scrutiny of the O'Brien 6 1 test. The Supreme Court,
however, rejected this reasoning. Acknowledging that "virtually every
means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the ex-
penditure of money,"" 7 and that the 1974 Act's limitations affect an area
of fundamental first amendment activities,"' the Court stated that "[a]
restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on polit-
ical communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity
of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of
their exploration, and the size of the audience reached."" 9 The Court
112. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
113. In Buckley, the Court "back[ed] off grandeur or exuberance of expression at every
opportunity, preferring to affect its driest persona, studious to find a middle way between
the extremes of the FECA amendments and no election reform at all." Polsby, supra note
7, at 17. See also Fleishman & McCorkle, Level-Up Rather Than Level-Down: Towards a
New Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 1 J. L. & Pol. 211, 222-23 (1984) (Buckley
represents attempt by Court to "forge a King Solomon's policy compromise.... [cutting]
right down the middle of the issue rather than presenting a closely-argued constitutional
analysis that clearly came down on one side or the other.") (footnote omitted).
114. In criticizing the Supreme Court's opinion, Judge Leventhal of the D.C. Circuit
stated that the Court failed to appreciate "any sense of the history of campaign reform
legislation, of the grievous abuses that prompted it, the frustration that accompanied it,
the evasion and political pressures that have undermined all less-than-comprehensive
measures of reform." Leventhal, supra note 111, at 362.
115. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (per curiam),
afl'd in part and rev'd in part, 425 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
116. In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the defendant claimed that the
first amendment prevented his prosecution for burning his draft card, arguing that the
burning was symbolic speech. Id at 376. The O'Brien Court rejected this claim, holding
that the government possessed a sufficient interest in regulating the non-speech elements
of the draft card burning to allow the incidental restriction on speech-related activity. Id.
at 376-77.
117. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam).
118. Id at 14.
119. Id. at 19. The Court distinguished political spending from conduct, noting that
[t]he distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails printing, paper, and
circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall and
publicizing the event. The electorate's increasing dependence on television, ra-
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refused to equate the expenditure of money with political conduct as de-
fined in United States v. O'Brien 120 and, accordingly, imposed strict first
amendment scrutiny on FECA's direct restrictions on the expenditure of
money. 121
Once it had resolved this issue, the Court distinguished contribution
limitations from expenditure limitations. The Court said that "[t]he ex-
penditure limitations contained in the Act represent substantial rather
than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of polit-
ical speech."' 122 Contribution limitations, on the other hand, "entail[ ]
only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in
free communication." '23 The Court believed that the contribution limi-
tations imposed by the Act would have little impact on the funding of
campaigns and political associations. 24 The result of the distinction was
that the contribution limitations received less constitutional scrutiny,
and, since Buckley, they have been upheld by the Court. 125
Given these initial decisions on the level of scrutiny involved, the
Court moved on to evaluating the constitutionality of the specific provi-
sions of the 1974 Act. As it examined individual parts of FECA, the
Court tended to uphold those sections that appeared to be contribution
limitations designed to prevent corruption. 126 With one exception,
27
however, it struck down spending limitations intended to equalize the
dio, and other mass media for news and information has made these expensive
modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political speech.
Id.
120. Id. at 16. The Court also stated that the restrictions could not stand, even under
the O'Brien test, "because the governmental interests advanced in support of the Act
involve[d] 'suppressing communication.'" Id. at 17. See Winter, Political Financing and
the Constitution, 486 Annals 34, 37 (1986) ("If the speech protected by the First Amend-
ment is legally distinct from the use of money or resources to speak, then there simply is
no effective First Amendment protection for speech."). The issue of symbolic speech may
present an even more critical issue in the party context, as the parties do not possess the
full spending alternatives that are open to the other groups in the poltical process. See
infra note 331 and accompanying text.
121. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1976) (per curiam). Justice White, how-
ever, continues to hold the position that "[t]he First Amendment protects the right to
speak, not the right to spend, and limitations on the amount of money that can be spent
are not the same as restrictions on speaking." Federal Election Comm'n v. National
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 508 (1985) (White, J., dissenting).
122. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
123. Id. at 20-21.
124. Id. at 21. In language that would have a substantial impact on the activities of
political groups in raising funds, the Court said that "[t]he overall effect of the Act's
contribution ceilings is merely to require candidates and political committees to raise
funds from a greater number of persons .... Id. at 21-22.
125. See infra notes 176-79 and 194-210 and accompanying text.
126. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-38 (upholding the Act's $1,000 limitation on individ-
ual contributions, the $5,000 limitation on contributions by PACs, the limitation on vol-
unteers' incidental expenses, and the $25,000 limitation on total contributions in one
calendar year).
127. The Court upheld the public funding provisions of FECA, which provided funds
to presidential candidates. See Buckley, at 85-108. Spending limits were imposed on can-
didates who accepted these funds. In Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election
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resources available to candidates.1 28
First, the Court upheld the validity of limitations on individual and
group contributions to candidates or political groups. The Court found
that "[ilt [was] unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary purpose-
to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large
individual financial contributions-in order to find a constitutionally suf-
ficient justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation."' 29 The Court
found that these limitations effectively eliminated the problem of corrup-
tion "while leaving persons free to engage in independent political ex-
pression, to associate actively through volunteering their services, and to
assist to a limited but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candi-
dates and committees with financial resources."'"3 While restrictions
that were successfully characterized as contribution limitations received
a sort of constitutional immunity, much of the Buckley opinion involved
striking down various spending limits imposed by FECA.'3 ' In so doing,
the Court specifically rejected two primary goals of Congress in limiting
campaign spending: the overall reduction of expenditures in political
campaigns, and, more generally, the equalization of expenditures among
political candidates." 2
Second, the Court rejected the limitations placed on total campaign
expenditures as an unjustified restriction on political expression. 133 The
Court emphasized that the first amendment prevents the government
from deciding that money spent to advance one's political views is a
Comm'n, 487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y.), afid, 445 U.S. 955 (1980), the Court aflirmed a
lower court decision that allowed a spending limit where the presidential candidate had
accepted public funding. Despite the strong argument that these limitations comprise an
"unconstitutional condition," Nicholson, Political Campaign Expenditure Limitations
and the Unconstitutional Condition Doctrine, 10 Hastings Const. L.Q. 601, 601-02 (1983),
the Court has not re-examined this view.
128. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-59 (striking down the Act's S1,000 limitation on ex-
penditures "relative to a clearly identified candidate," the limitation on expenditures by
candidates from personal or family resources, and the limitations on campaign
expenditures).
129. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26. To date, this anti-corruption rationale has been the only
one accepted by the Court for limiting political freedom in the campaign finance context.
See infra text accompanying notes 185-93. As this Article will argue, the parties simply
do not present a comparable threat of corruption, and therefore these limitations should
be struck down. See infra text accompanying notes 312-35.
130. 424 U.S. at 28. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting on this point, argued that
"[1]imiting contributions, as a practical matter, will limit expenditures and will put an
effective ceiling on the amount of political activity and debate that the Government will
permit to take place." Id. at 242 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
131. See, e.g., 424 U.S. at 54 (striking down § 608(a) limiting expenditures by candi-
dates from personal funds); id. at 58 (striking down § 608(c) limiting overall expenditures
by candidates).
132. See id at 57 ("mere growth in the cost of federal election campaigns in and of
itself provides no basis for governmental restrictions on the quantity of campaign
spending").
133. See id at 55 ("[n]o governmental interest that has been suggested is sufficient tojustify the restriction on the quantity of political expression imposed by [the Act]").
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"wasteful, excessive, or unwise" expenditure.' 34 Despite the continuing
rise of campaign costs, the Court has shown no inclination to reconsider
this part of the holding.135
Third, the Court invalidated the limitations the 1974 Act placed on
independent expenditures by committees or groups, holding that "the in-
dependent advocacy restricted by the provision does not presently appear
to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those iden-
tified with large campaign contributions."136 This holding paved the way
for the growth of independent expenditure committees, such as the Na-
tional Conservative Political Action Committee, that subsequently have
begun to play a much larger role in political campaigns. 137
Fourth, the Court rejected the limits placed on a candidate's ability to
spend on behalf of his or her own campaign. The Court held that "[t]he
candidate, no less than any other person, has a First Amendment right to
engage in the discussion of public issues and vigorously and tirelessly to
advocate his own election and the election of other candidates."' 138
When candidates can finance their own campaigns with unlimited per-
sonal funds they are less likely to become dependent on outside contribu-
134. See id. at 57. This is perhaps the area where the legitimacy of congressional goals
has been most clearly refuted. Despite the dramatic increases in campaign spending since
the 1960s, there is a strong argument that American campaign expenditures are small
relative both to other countries and to other measures of spending. See D. Adamany &
G. Agree, supra note 2, at 26-7; A. Heard, supra note 40, at 371-75; G. Thayer, supra
note 57, at 274-75.
135. Although costs continue to rise, there is some evidence that campaign costs will
level off, as returns from spending may begin to diminish at some level. See Jackson, New
Congress Relied Heavily on FAC Donations, But Much of Spending Had Little Effect on
Results, Wall St. J., Dec. 24, 1986, at 32, col. 1. In the 1986 elections, while Republican
senatorial candidates had a substantial spending advantage, the Democrats won 20 of 34
races, regaining the Senate majority. This election provides additional data for the posi-
tion that the primary element in becoming a competitive candidate is not spending parity,
but the ability to campaign with a significant base of funds. See Berke, G.O.P. Lost Sen-
ate with $107 Million, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1987, at 28. The parties can help provide this
base of funds if the spending limits are eliminated. See infra notes 337-49 and accompa-
nying text.
136. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46 (1976) (per curiam). As discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 209-10, this holding does not seem accurately to reflect political
reality, either in the potential for corruption or the ability of these expenditures to assist a
candidate. Cf Senate Report, supra note 89, at 5604 ("to prohibit a $60,000 direct con-
tribution to be used for a TV spot commercial but then to permit the would-be contribu-
tor to purchase the time himself, and place a commercial endorsing the candidate, would
exalt constitutional form over substance"). As demonstrated by NCPAC, however, the
Court has been protective of the rights of political committees to spend in ways other
than through contributions, even in the publicly-funded presidential race. See Federal
Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 501
(1985) (upholding on first amendment grounds the right of political committees to incur
expenditures with respect to presidential and vice-presidential candidates). The avenue
involved in NCPAC is not open to political parties. See infra text accompanying note
331.
137. See generally Sabato, Parties, PA Cs, and Independent Groups, in The American
Elections of 1982 72, 86-102 (T. Mann & N. Ornstein eds. 1983) (discussing activities and
function of PACs).
138. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52 (1976) (per curiam).
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tions and less susceptible to corruption by big contributors. Thus, the
use of personal funds furthers the policy goals underlying the Act's con-
tribution limitations.' 39 This holding has resulted in a dramatic increase
in the amount of personal money that has been spent in campaigns,"4
which in turn has led to increased concern that the campaign for federal
office is becoming even more exclusively a privilege of the wealthy.
B. The Supreme Court's Role in the Evolution of the Current System
Since Buckley,14' the Supreme Court has addressed the constitutional-
ity of various other limitations placed on financial participation in cam-
paigns. 42 Despite the range of issues it has confronted in the campaign
finance context, the Court has failed to develop a consistent structure for
resolving the dominant issues in this area. Accordingly, these cases have
formed a hesitant, step-by-step progression that has not addressed many
of the concerns present in the campaign process. The Court's failure to
recognize political reality and its inability to determine the level of defer-
ence owed to congressional expertise have resulted in a campaign finance
system that fully satisfies few people143-a result foreshadowed by Chief
Justice Burger in Buckley.'" The Court's decisions since Buckley indi-
139. Id. at 53. This logic and policy should be extended to cover the parties in spend-
ing on behalf of their own candidates. See infra text accompanying notes 341-44.
140. See Bonafede, Some Things Don't Change-Cost of 1982 Congressional Races
Higher than Ever, 1982 Nat. J. 1832 (Oct. 30, 1982) (observing the steady increase in
political contributions and the great number of wealthy candidates).
141. In Buckley, the Court discussed other issues dealing with the specific provisions of
FECA the above-mentioned holdings are the ones that are the most relevant to the argu-
ments presented in this Article. Of most immediate importance to Congress was the
Court's decision that the composition of the Federal Election Committee was unconstitu-
tional. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 109-43. The Court stayed its decision on the FEC for
thirty days to allow Congress to reconstitute the Commission. Id. at 143. Aside from
being required for the general enforcement of FECA, a reconstituted FEC was necessary
to certify that presidential candidates had qualified for public financing funds. Congress
took more than one hundred days to reconstitute the FEC. During this period, several of
the candidates were forced, in the absence of public funds, to curtail severely their cam-
paign activities.
The delays that occurred in passing the 1976 amendments contributed to some of the
concerns with public financing, as there was concern that Congress' political interests
contributed to the delay in recreating the FEC. See Polsby, supra note 7, at 35-41. Even-
tually, Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub.
L. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (1976).
142. See infra notes 158-210 and accompanying text.
143. For some recent critiques of the state of the campaign finance system, see Bing-
ham, Democracy or Plutocracy? The Case for a Constitutional Amendment to Overturn
Buckley v. Valeo, 486 Annals 103 (1986); Mathias, Should There Be Public Financing of
Congressional Campaigns?, 486 Annals 64 (1986) (advocating public financing); Wert-
heimer, Campaign Finance Reform The Unfinished Agenda, 486 Annals 86 (1986) (Con-
gress should enact public financing for congressional campaigns as it did for presidential
campaigns and place restrictions on PAC funding of congressional campaigns).
144. In his separate opinion, Chief Justice Burger warned that
[b]y dissecting the Act bit by bit, and casting off vital parts, the Court fails to
recognize that the whole of this Act is greater than the sum of its parts. Con-
gress intended to regulate all aspects of federal campaign finances, but what
1987]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
cate the difficulties it faces in this area. As one commentator has stated,
"[t]he Court's approach to constitutional challenges to attempts to regu-
late political funding have not resulted in a model of judicial clarity."' 45
In attempting to oversee the congressional efforts to design a campaign
finance system, the Court has failed to treat the campaign finance system
as an integrated structure, despite urgings by finance scholars 146 and pe-
remains after today's holding leaves no more than a shadow of what Congress
contemplated. I question whether the residue leaves a workable program.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 235-36 (1976) (per curiam) (Burger, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
145. Nicholson, supra note 127, at 605. See also Smolka, The Campaign Law in the
Courts, in Money and Politics in the United States: Financing Elections in the 1980's 214,
214 (M. Malbin ed. 1984) ("The more the courts look at the [FECA], the less they see
that can pass constitutional muster.").
The Court, in recent cases, clearly has been troubled by the Act's various restrictions
on the ability of groups and individuals to express political opinions. For example, in
Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S.
480 (1985), the Court struck down limits on independent expenditures made by NCPAC
in conjunction with the publicly funded presidential race. See id. at 497-98; infra text
accompanying notes 185-93. In Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, 107 S. Ct. 616, 624 (1986), the Court rejected, as applied, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982),
which bans corporate expenditures in conjunction with federal election campaigns. See
id. at 631; infra text accompanying notes 170-74.
Slowly, the Court may be moving toward a campaign finance system anchored by effec-
tive disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures, rather than the full panoply
of regulations present today. Such a system would meet all the requirements of Congress'
desired finance system except for the need for an independent policing officer. The FEC
could fulfill this requirement, although the FEC has come under significant challenge.
See Edsall, Is the FEC Undermining Campaign Law?, The Wash. Post, Oct. 22, 1986 at
A23 (discussing the rulings of the FEC); Jackson, Election Commission, Set Up as a
Watchdog, Has Become A Pussycat, Wall Street. J., Oct. 19, 1987 at 1, col. 1.
In various forms, this policed disclosure position has been urged by finance scholars
since the earliest regulations. See supra note 93 and accompanying text; see also Winter,
supra note 120, at 45 ("So far as corruption is concerned, it is difficult to perceive why full
disclosure of contributions and their sources to the electorate is not an adequate deterrent
...."). But see Mathias, supra note 143, at 65 ("In the real world, campaign finance laws
are necessary rules of behavior designed to protect the political process and promote
certain basic democratic values. These laws and their enforcement help ensure that elec-
tions and government itself are free of abuses that would subvert democratic society.").
This type of system would probably offer the most effective means of fulfilling the policies
of the first amendment, as it would minimize legislative interference with the marketplace
of ideas and would allow the public to choose candidates based on full information re-
garding campaign contributions. Because this step has not been taken, however, the Act,
as it has been interpreted by the Courts, fails to fulfill the primary purposes of FECA.
See Fleishman & McCorkle, supra note 113, at 212; see also Smolka, supra, at 214 ("Con-
gress has been left with a law that conforms to no one's idea of sound public policy
.... ").
146. See, e.g., Fleishman, supra note 35, at 865-66. As Professor Fleishman put it,
the entire election reform law must be viewed as a whole. The principal govern-
mental objectives which campaign finance regulations are directed at attaining
... interact so sensitively that it is impossible, in fact, to evaluate separately the
constitutionality of particular instruments for achieving them .... Because of
these interdependencies, and in view of the fact that Congress enacted the vari-
ous provisions as a single, unified regulatory scheme, it would be unfair for the
Court to assess the constitutionality of component parts in isolation from other
pertinent elements of the scheme. As the Court itself has observed on several
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riodic statements by the Court itself.'47 This failure has led to a gradual
destruction of Congress' carefully-drawn balance between protecting first
amendment rights and eliminating corruption. Although the Court ap-
pears, at times, to acknowledge congressional expertise in this area, it has
not attempted, for the most part, to evaluate its own interpretations of
specific sections of the finance system in light of the integrated, statutory
system. 148
Buckley presented a difficult case, given the interaction of public out-
rage, significant constitutional infirmities, and the extreme self-interest of
Congress in passing the law. 149 As costs continue to rise in political cam-
paigns, however, and political action committees ("PACs") continue to
provide large percentages of candidates' receipts, with incumbents receiv-
ing a disproportionate amount of contributions, it is clear that both Con-
gress and the Court must take some responsibility for the system as it
now stands.' 50
occasions in passing on laws regulating elections, it is the 'laws taken as a
whole' that count.
Id. (footnotes omitted); cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 255 (1976) (per curiam) (Burger,
C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("To invoke a severability clause to salvage
parts of a comprehensive, integrated statutory scheme, which parts, standing alone, are
unworkable and in many aspects unfair, exalts a formula at the expense of the broad
objectives of Congress.").
147. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197,
210 (1982) ("[W]e accept Congress' judgment that it is the potential for such influence
that demands regulation. Nor will we second-guess a legislative determination as to the
need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil feared."); California Medical
Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 198-99 (1981) (accepting the regula-
tions as loophole-closing provisions, within the financing scheme). But see Federal Elec-
tion Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 107 S. Ct. 616, 631 (1986) (rejecting the
prohibitions at issue as overbroad attempts by Congress to regulate protected conduct);
Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S.
480, 500 (1985) (rejecting as overbroad statute which "indiscriminately lumps with cor-
porations any 'committee, association, or organization.'" (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 9012 F
(1982))).
148. "The Court's effort to blend First Amendment principles and practical politics
has produced a strange offspring." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 253 (1976) (per curiam)
(Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
149. See Fleishman, supra note 35, at 852-53 ("[I]ndignation and outrage, while fre-
quently necessary to energize legislative action, are rarely the most favorable auspices for
constructive, carefully considered lasting change. And that is even more the case when
the legislative subject matter is one in which every member of Congress has a direct
personal interest ....").
150. A preliminary study of the 1986 elections indicates that campaign costs continue
to rise at high rates. Winning candidates in races for House seats spent an average of
$340,000, an increase of 17% above 1984 amounts and a four-fold increase above 1976
amounts. See Jackson, New Congress Relied Heavily on PAC Donations, But Much of
Spending Had Little Effect on Results, Wall St. J., Dec. 24, 1986, at 32, col. 1. Winning
senatorial candidates spent, on average, approximately S3 million, a five-fold increase
over 1976 figures. Id. PACs contributed more than $126 million to federal candidates in
1986, up 25% from 1984 contributions. Id At least S98 million of this amount went to
winning candidates. Id PAC receipts constituted 42% of the funds for winning candi-
dates for the House, and 27% for victorious senatorial candidates. Id The mean spend-
ing for major-party senatorial candidates in 1986 was $2,681,639, up from S2,201,037 in
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This system grew out of the Supreme Court's inability to come to grips
with a few fundamental issues in the campaign finance context. Perhaps
the most troublesome dilemma for the Supreme Court has been the issue
of whether the concept of undue influence has any role to play in the
context of regulating campaign finances. Since Buckley, "[tihe question
is not whether individual free speech is an absolute value, but whether
individuals [or groups] may be prevented from acquiring too much polit-
ical influence by a too-vigorous exercise of the individual right to free
speech."'"
The undue influence issue takes one of two forms. The first involves
concern that undue influence could amount to the ability of a certain
group to spend so as to dominate the campaign process and drive oppos-
ing views from the political marketplace.152 The second blends into the
corruption analysis by looking at certain spending as so extensive that it
would give the spender too much influence with the candidate.
153
1. Distortion of Political Arena
In support of the view that disproportionate wealth distorts the polit-
ical process to a point that regulation is required, many commentators
have urged the Court to adopt a "level-down" theory, designed to equal-
ize the resources of candidates by limiting the amounts that wealthy or
well-funded candidates can spend on their campaigns. 154 The Court di-
1984. See Huckabee & Cantor, Senate Campaign Expenditures, Receipts and Sources of
Funds: 1980-86, at 5 (C.R.S. 1987).
151. Polsby, supra note 7, at 20-21. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per
curiam), Chief Justice Burger noted in a separate opinion:
In my view Congress can no more ration political expression than it can ration
religious expression; and limits on political or religious contributions and ex-
penditures effectively curb expression in both areas. There are many prices we
pay for the freedoms secured by the First Amendment; the risk of undue influ-
ence is one of them, confirming what we have long known: Freedom is hazard-
ous, but some restraints are worse.
Id. at 256-57 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
152. This view is very similar to the "drown-out" concept enunciated in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387 (1969). It has been discussed most com-
monly in cases involving corporate speech. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Massa-
chusetts Citizens for Life, 107 S. Ct. 616, 624 (1986) (statute attempts to keep dominant
voices from impeding speech of others); Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to
Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982) ("potential for [corporate and labor] influence
... demands regulation"); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788-89 (1978) (pre-
serving integrity of electoral process essential).
153. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976) (per curiam).
154. Judge Skelly Wright has forcefully articulated this position, see Wright, Money
and the Pollution ofPolitics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82
Colum. L. Rev. 609 (1982); Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85
Yale L.J. 1001 (1976); see also E. Drew, Politics and Money: The New Road to Corrup-
tion (1983); Cox, Constitutional Issues in the Regulation of the Financing of Election
Campaigns, 31 Clev. St. L. Rev. 395 (1982); Wertheimer, Campaign Finance Reform:
The Unfinished Agenda, 486 Annals 86 (1986). See generally Fleishman & McCorkle,
supra note 113 (describing the "level-down" and "level-up" theories). While the "level-
down" view advocates limits on campaign expenditures so that there can be a general
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rectly rejected this view, however, as contrary to the first amendment's
assurance of the free exchange of political ideas. I" The Court's position
on this issue has met with substantial approval,15 6 as "[g]overnmental
abridgements that are aimed at enlarging the collective interest by sup-
pressing individual expression, even in the presence of massive docu-
mentation that the two interests are in hopeless conflict, are
unconstitutional."1
57
The issue next presented itself in First National Bank v. Bellotti, the
first campaign finance case following Buckley. Bellotti involved a chal-
lenge to a Massachusetts law that prohibited corporations from spending
in referendums unless the spending was on issues that related to the oper-
ations of the business.' 59 Proponents of the law argued that the concen-
tration of corporate wealth threatened to distort the public debate on
referendum issues.le °
equality of spending, see id at 229, the "level-up" advocates argue that limited public
subsidies should be used to increase the speech abilities of lesser-financed candidates,
rather than limiting the speech opportunities of better-financed candidates. See id. at 215.
The author of this Article is in substantial agreement with the policy goals of the level-up
proponents, but this Article urges that the parties be allowed to perform the "level-up"
aspects of the campaign finance scheme, rather than the public treasury.
155. The Court stated that
the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment, which was designed "to secure 'the widest possible dissemi-
nation of information from diverse and antagonistic sources'" and "'to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people."'
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 269 (1964), quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1, 20 (1945), and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957), respectively); see
also Fleishman & McCorkle, supra note 113, at 234 ("The undeniable effect of Buckley
was to sanction Level-Up speech egalitarianism as a constitutionally permissible policy
and to brand Level-Down speech egalitarianism as an unconstitutional 'reconstructive'
vision.").
156. See, eg., Fleishman & McCorkle, supra note 113, at 214 ("Yet the Level-Down
vision is not only inconsistent with Buckley but also enjoys almost no support in the
modem First Amendment tradition."); Powe, supra note 89, at 246 (This Level-Down
theory "has developed over the years on foundations that are foreign to the First Amend-
ment; the theory has no place in any sensible treatment of the First Amendment and
should, in the future, be summarily rejected."); Winter, supra note 120, at 38 ("Rarely
has so sinister a proposition been so attractively packaged, for if government may silence
certain speakers in the name of equality, constitutional protection for political communi-
cation would soon cease to exist.").
157. Polsby, supra note 7, at 20.
158. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
159. Id at 767.
160. See id at 789-90. While several of the major election law cases involve provisions
of state law, these provisions possess direct relevance to the constitutionality of FECA
because the first amendment applies in exactly the same manner to both state and federal
election laws. See Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 387 (1927) (incorporating first amend-
ment free speech protections into fourteenth amendment). In addition, precedents such
as Bellotti and Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981),
will provide guidance for any future FECA amendments.
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In a five-to-four decision, the Court struck down the Massachusetts
restriction. In contrast to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,
which focused on the existence and extent of corporate first amendment
rights, 161 the Supreme Court saw the issue as a possible statutory limita-
tion on first amendment rights to free expression. 162 By posing the ques-
tion in this way, the Court focused on the nature of the speech and the
gain to the potential listeners from this speech.
163
The Court rejected the government's claim that the restrictions were
necessary to prevent a "drowning out"" effect caused by corporate
speech so extensive that other voices could not be heard. The Court said
that "if there be any danger that the people cannot evaluate the informa-
tion and arguments advanced by appellants, it is a danger contemplated
by the Framers of the First Amendment."' 165 To the Court, the fact that
the electorate could be persuaded by good advocacy hardly was reason to
suppress political speech.' 66
161. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 775-76 (1978).
162. Id. at 776.
163. Id. at 777. To the Court, the restrictions "amount[ed] to an impermissible legisla-
tive prohibition of speech based on the identity of the interests that spokesmen may repre-
sent in public debate over controversial issues and a requirement that the speaker have a
sufficiently great interest in the subject to justify communication." Id. at 784. As dis-
cussed infra at text accompanying notes 297-306, this language can be applied to the
content-based restrictions that inhibit the speaking abilities of the political parties.
164. The concept of "drowning out" flows from the rationale enunciated by the Court
in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
By attempting to equalize the resources of the candidates, Congress sought to
ensure that a candidate could not obtain an undue advantage through excessive
media exposure. Accordingly, the First Amendment would be enhanced by leg-
islatively imposed equality, since neither side would be in a position to over-
whelm the other quantitatively in the mass media.
Powe, supra note 89, at 251. The spending limitations "flowed from the implicit conclu-
sion of Red Lion that in a mass society there is reason to fear the drowning out of voices
in the marketplace of ideas." Id.
165. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 (1978). The Court's holding pro-
voked a vigorous dissent from Justice White, who has been the strongest critic on the
Court of the Court's direction in campaign finance cases. To Justice White, "the restric-
tion of corporate speech concerned with political matters impinges much less severely
upon the availability of ideas to the general public than do restrictions upon individual
speech.... [I]t is unlikely that any significant communication would be lost by such a
prohibition." Id. at 807.
The Bellotti opinion has provoked a large amount of scholarly commentary. See, e.g.,
Miller, Politics, Democracy, and the First Amendment, in Politics, Democracy, and the
Supreme Court: Essays on the Frontier of Constitutional Theory 277 (A. Miller ed.
1985); Nicholson, The Constitutionality of the Federal Restrictions on Corporate and
Union Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 65 Cornell L. Rev. 945 (1980);
O'Kelley, The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Ex-
pression and the Corporation after First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 Geo. L.J. 1347
(1979).
166. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790 ("The Constitution 'protects expression which is eloquent
no less than that which is unconvincing.'" (quoting Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Re-
gents, 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959))). In Bellotti, the Court appeared to leave open the possi-
bility of showing undue influence with better evidence. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789-90.
Despite this language, the Court has not been receptive to this kind of evidence. See
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In Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work Commit-
tee, 6 7 the Court addressed the constitutionality of a FECA provision
that limited corporate PACs to soliciting contributions from "mem-
bers." 168 Despite the strong considerations favoring rejection of this pro-
vision as applied, the Court deferred to Congress' judgment on the need
for such a provision in the overall campaign finance scheme, given the
historical concern with the threat of corporate and union money in fed-
eral elections. 1
69
Most recently, in Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citi-
zens for Life, Inc.,7 ° the Court rejected a ban on corporate expenditures
where the corporation was an ideological, nonprofit corporation formed
Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S.
480, 493 (1985). Nevertheless, the arguments continue to surface in cases involving
corporations.
167. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
168. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(C) (1982). Membership organizations can solicit contribu-
tions from "members of such organization[s]." IdL § 441b(b)(4)(C). Similarly, the elec-
tion laws prohibit solicitations for PACs set up by labor organizations to "any person
other than its members and their families." Id § 441b(b)(4)(A)(ii). Under FECA, cor-
porations may establish "separate segregated fund[s]" which can receive and make con-
tributions on behalf of federal candidates. See id. § 441b (b)(4)(C). This fund may be
controlled completely by the corporation, see Federal Election Comm'n v. National
Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 200 n.4 (1982), but the "'fund must be separate
from the sponsoring union [or corporation] only in the sense that there must be a strict
segregation of its monies'" from the other assets of the sponsoring organization. Id.
(quoting Pipefitters v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 414-17 (1972)).
169. See Right to Work, 459 U.S. at 210 ("[W]e accept Congress' judgment that it is
the potential for such influence that demands regulation. Nor will we second-guess a
legislative determination as to the need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the
evil feared."); cf Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 500-01 (1985) (rejecting as overbroad a provision applied against
all independent expenditures in presidential races, despite arguments as to potential cor-
ruption from certain large expenditures).
The National Right to Work Committee was a nonprofit corporation without capital
stock, that was organized "'[t]o help make the public aware of the fact that American
citizens are being required, against their will, to join and pay dues to labor organizations
in order to earn a living.'" Right to Work, 459 U.S. at 199-200 (quoting Committee's
stated purpose in corporation's Virginia articles of incorporation, App. to Pet. for Cert.
17a). Because the Right to Work Committee was a nonprofit organization that solicited
funds to publicize its views, some of the logic behind limiting corporate spending was not
applicable. This organization was an ideological one to which people contributed because
of sympathy with the ideology, and therefore no valid concerns existed regarding eco-
nomic power being used in the political marketplace.
In Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 107 S. Ct. 616, 631
(1986), the Court rejected the application of a related statute to a similar corporation.
While stating that it was in no way overruling Right to Work, see id. at 631 n.13, it is
difficult to see how that holding can remain good law. Massachusetts Citizens for Life
was a non-profit corporation that distributed voting-related literature. Id. at 619-20. In
distinguishing between traditional business corporations and the ideological, nonprofit
corporation involved in the case, the Court somewhat ignored its approach in Right to
Work. See id. at 631. It seemed hesitant to strike down the entire statute, yet the argu-
ments for allowing Massachusetts Citizens for Life to engage in the speech it did were
very strong. See id. at 63 1.
170. 107 S. Ct. 616 (1986).
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to spread the views of the organization on specific issues.' 7 ' The Court
acknowledged that this statutory prohibition forcing corporations to es-
tablish PACs to participate in federal campaigns infringed on first
amendment activities, yet it refused to strike down the whole statute. 1
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Instead, the Court rejected the justifications for the statute in this con-
text, stating that "[v]oluntary political associations do not suddenly pres-
ent the specter of corruption merely by assuming the corporate form.' 7 3
This holding clearly conflicts with the logic of Right to Work, 17 illustrat-
ing some of the difficulties the Court has had in deciding how much it
will defer to congressional concerns that corporate spending might domi-
nate the political debate.
2. Corruption
Apart from addressing concerns that massive spending by certain
groups could distort political debate, the Court has also struggled with
the fear that financial contributions to campaigns might corrupt candi-
dates for elective office. This fear, heightened by Watergate, clearly mo-
tivated the 1974 Act. 175 The Court has remained relatively receptive to
limitations justified by the threat of corruption. In its decisions, how-
ever, the Court has maintained a somewhat narrow view of the areas in
which this threat exists, and, consequently, the Court's jurisprudence in
this area is not especially consistent.
In California Medical Association v. Federal Election Commission,176
the Court addressed the issue of what limitations could be placed on the
ability of groups to contribute to PACs. 177 The appellants asserted that
because such contributions are made to a political committee, rather
than to a candidate, the threat of corruption of the political process is
eliminated and limitations on contributions, therefore, are unjustified. 17
The Court rejected this challenge, however, stating that because limita-
tions on individual contributions to an organization that backs a single
candidate do not infringe the first amendment rights of contributors, lim-
itations on contributions to "multicandidate political committee[s]" simi-
larly do not impair the rights of such contributors. 79
In other contexts, the Court has proved less willing to defer to legisla-
tive judgments on the need for campaign regulation, even when such reg-
ulation arguably diminishes the threat of corruption. In Citizens Against
Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 8° the Court addressed a California law,
171. Id. at 628-29.
172. Id. at 626-27.
173. Id. at 630.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 167-69.
175. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
176. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
177. Id. at 193-201.
178. Id. at 195.
179. Id. at 196 n.16.
180. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
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adopted by referendum, that limited to $250 the amount that groups
could spend in a referendum campaign.' 8 ' In an eight-to-one decision,
with Justice White as the lone dissenter, the Court struck down the
law.18 2 Arguing that contributions by individuals to a committee advo-
cating a particular position on a ballot is a legitimate and significant form
of political expression, 8 3 the Court concluded that "[t]o place a Spartan
limit-or indeed any limit-on individuals wishing to band together to
advance their views on a ballot measure, while placing none on individu-
als acting alone, is clearly a restraint on the right of association."'"
Perhaps the most important campaign finance case concerning the
threat of corruption from political spending is Federal Election Commis-
sion v. National Conservative Political Action Committee ("NCPAC"). 8 5
This case challenged section 9012 of the Presidential Election Campaign
Fund Act,'8 6 which limited independent expenditures 8 7 in the publicly-
financed presidential race to $1,000."18 Once again, the Court struck
down the provision. Reaffirming the principle that "preventing corrup-
tion or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compel-
ling government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign
finances,"' 8 9 the Court held that the anti-corruption aspects of section
181. Id at 292.
182. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
183. Id at 298.
184. Id. at 296. In language that the Court has not clarified in later cases, the majority
also concluded that "[p]lacing limits on contributions which in turn limit expenditures
plainly impairs freedom of expression. The integrity of the political system will be ade-
quately protected if contributors are identified in a public filing revealing the amounts
contributed; if it is thought wise, legislation can outlaw anonymous contributions." Id. at
299-300. This approach differs from the Court's feeling in Buckley, where it stated that
Congress was surely entitled to conclude that disclosure was only a partial mea-
sure, and that contribution ceilings were a necessary legislative concomitant to
deal with the reality or appearance of corruption inherent in a system permit-
ting unlimited financial contributions, even when the identities of the contribu-
tors and the amounts of their contributions are fully disclosed.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976) (per curiam). See also Federal Election Comm'n
v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 107 S. Ct. 616, 630 (1986) (disclosure obligations are
sufficient to monitor any threats from independent corporate expenditures); sources cited
supra note 93 (discussing the benefits of a disclosure-based finance system).
185. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
186. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013 (1982).
187. 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1982) defines independent expenditures as follows:
an expenditure by a person expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate which is made without cooperation or consultation
with any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such candidate,
and which is not made in concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, any
candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such candidate.
188. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U.S. 480, 482 (1985). A similar issue came before the Court in Common Cause v.
Schmitt, 455 U.S. 129 (1982) (mem.) (per curiam), aff'g 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980),
but the four-four Court decision affirming the lower court did not resolve the issue. Id. at
129.
189. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985).
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9012 did not justify the significant burden on protected first amendment
rights.
190
In resolving the case, the Court gave a narrow construction to the term
"corruption," stating that, "[t]he hallmark of corruption is the financial
quid pro quo: dollars for political favors."' 19 1 With this definition, the
Court rejected the expenditure limitation because the hypothetical possi-
bility 192 of corruption through independent expenditures was insufficient
to allow the significant restriction on protected first amendment rights. 1
93
3. The Contribution/Expenditure Distinction
One important factor in the resolution of these cases involves the level
of scrutiny to be given to the various portions of FECA. The level of
scrutiny, while often not clearly delineated, 194 usually has depended on
whether the Court has defined a regulation as inhibiting contributions or
expenditures.' 95 The Court developed this distinction in Buckley and ul-
timately upheld contribution limits, while rejecting limitations on
expenditures. 196
The Court's rationale for the distinction rests on shaky grounds and
from the start this distinction has drawn a substantial amount of criti-
cism. 19 7 Most recently, in NCPAC, a dissenting Justice Marshall aban-
190. Id. at 501.
191. Id. at 497. The Court therefore felt that "the absence of prearrangement and
coordination undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, and thereby alle-
viates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quidpro quo for improper commit-
ments from the candidate." Id. at 498.
192. The Court recognized the possibility that "candidates may take notice of and
reward those responsible for PAC expenditures by giving official favors to the latter in
exchange for the supporting messages.... On this record, such an exchange of political
favors for uncoordinated expenditures remains a hypothetical possibility and nothing
more." Id.
193. Id. Justice White fired off an angry dissent, arguing that "[b]y striking down one
portion of an integrated and comprehensive statute, the Court has once again trans-
formed a coherent regulatory scheme into a nonsensical, loophole-ridden patchwork....
In overzealous protection of attenuated First Amendment values, the Court has once
again managed to assure us the worst of both worlds." Id. at 518 (White, J., dissenting).
194. See BeVier, supra note 31, at 1052; Nicholson, supra note 127, at 603-04, 607.
195. See supra notes 122-125 and accompanying text.
196. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (per curiam). The Court has decided that
contributions consist of "proxy speech," and thus limits on contributions do "not in any
way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues. While contribu-
tions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present
views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate involves
speech by someone other then the contributor." Id.
197. See id. at 241 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also id.
("For me contributions and expenditures are two sides of the same First Amendment
coin."); id. at 290 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("I am not per-
suaded that the Court makes, or indeed is able to make, a principled constitutional dis-
tinction between the contribution limitations, on the one hand, and the expenditure
limitations, on the other .... ); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 179
(1976) ("The distinction ignores the functional similarity of contributions and uncoordi-
nated political expenditures.").
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doned this view, saying that the distinction made no constitutional
difference. 9 ' What this distinction has meant is that the Court is much
more likely to uphold limitations that are fashioned as contribution lim-
its, rather than expenditure limitations.'99 Nevertheless, the Court does
not consider campaign contributions to be a form of political expression
other than a "general expression of support for the candidate and his
views."'2°" Limitations, therefore, can be placed on contributions, as
"[t]he quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase
perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests
solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing." ''
Commentators have challenged this argument,20 2 and even Justice
White, the Justice most strongly supportive of campaign spending limits,
apparently has rejected this rationale for the distinction.20 3 There are
two primary challenges to this distinction. First, given the nature of
political campaign speech, it is difficult to accept the view that contribu-
tions do not measure the intensity of support or that the quantity of com-
munication does not increase with the size of the contribution. Similarly,
the Court's rationale for allowing limits on contributions might justify
stricter limits on expenditures as well, because the nature of the speech
arguably is the same.2"
The inability of the Court to reach a principled resolution of the con-
198. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480, 519 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
199. See supra notes 125-128 and accompanying text.
200. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (per curiam).
201. Id. "At most, the size of the contribution provides a very rough index of the
intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate." Id.
202. See, eg., Friedman, A New Approach to the Dilemma of Campaign Finance Re-
form, 62 A.B.A. J. 72, 72 (Jan. 1976) ("Political contributions are a form of political
expression-for many people, indeed, the most effective form-and a ceiling on individ-
ual contibutions prevents them from expressing themselves as much as they may wish.");
The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 179 (1976) (functional similarity
between contribution and expenditure limits demands same degree of scrutiny).
203. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 810 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) ("Or-
dinarily, the expenditure of funds to promote political causes may be assumed to bear
some relation to the fervency with which they are held.").
204. As Professor Powe puts it,
[a]ll of the campaign finance cases involve speech by another.... The reason
professionals are used is that they are thought to know what is the most effica-
cious speech. But we do not conclude that a candidate's ad is proxy speech
simply because someone else wrote it for him and perhaps delivered it for him.
An individual choice to have a message with which he agrees prepared by pro-
fessionals is no less speech. Proxy speech is simply a pejorative name for a
political commercial. It is still speech.
Powe, supra note 89, at 258-59. See also Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conserva-
tive Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 495 (1985) ("Another reason the 'proxy
speech' approach is not useful.., is that the contributors obviously like the message they
are hearing from these organizations and want to add their voices to that message; other-
wise they would not part with their money."); cf Buckley v. Vaeo, 424 U.S. 1, 243
(1976) (per curiam) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("the contribu-
tion limitations will, in specific instances, limit exactly the same political activity that the
expenditure ceilings limit . . . ") (footnote omitted).
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tradictions inherent in the contribution/expenditure distinction reflects a
broader confusion that has plagued the Court throughout these cases.
The issue, simply put, is when should the Court allow political reality to
influence its first amendment analysis. From the start, the Court has
faced the issue of how much deference it owes to Congress' judgment on
the political risks presented by the potential for campaign abuse, and the
Court has shown a wavering deference 20 5 to Congress' arguable
expertise.20 6
In addition to this varying deference, the Court has been inconsistent
in its recognition of the realities of practical politics. In NCPAC, the
Court struck down the limitations on independent expenditures in presi-
dential campaigns as applied to political action committees.20 7 The
Court, however, ignored the evidence presented by the government that
the issue at hand really involved whether the expenditures in question
were independent of the candidates they were designed to help.2" 8 In-
stead, the Court almost blindly accepted the classification of the expendi-
tures as independent, even though the Court's rhetoric about the
differential impact of independent contributions made no real sense.20 9
205. Compare Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S.
197, 210 (1982) ("Nor will we second-guess a legislative determination as to the need for
prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil feared.") with Federal Election
Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 501 (1985)
("We are not quibbling over fine-tuning of prophylactic limitations, but are concerned
about wholesale restriction of clearly protected conduct.").
206. One issue that makes this area different from the usual analysis of congressional
expertise is the amount of self-interest present in these cases-perhaps more so than in
any other area where Congress legislates. Given this self-interest, first amendment con-
cerns stand most important, as "[flreedom of expression has particular significance with
respect to government because '[i]t is here that the state has a special incentive to repress
opposition and often wields a more effective power of suppression.'" First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.11 (1978) (quoting T. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of
the First Amendment 9 (1966)). While it is true, as Justice White has argued, that Con-
gress does have more expertise in the nitty-gritty of electoral politics, it is also true, how-
ever, that campaign finance represents one of the areas where we should most appreciate
the risk of those in power acting so that they can remain in power and keep others out.
See generally, J. Ely, supra note 38, at 106-07 (arguing that courts must pay special atten-
tion to legislative activity that might close channels of political change).
207. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480, 499-501 (1985).
208. See id.; see also id. at 502-04 (White, J., dissenting) (striking down section of Act
will cause individuals to pursue the status quo through more expensive avenues).
209. As the Court noted in NCPAC, "[t]he PACs in this case, of course, are not lone
pamphleteers or street corner orators in the Tom Paine mold; they spend substantial
amounts of money in order to communicate their political ideas through sophisticated
media advertisements." NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 493. The briefs supporting the law docu-
mented the interaction of NCPAC personnel and Reagan campaign officials, but the
Court refused to consider that evidence. See id. at 490. In addition, given the relatively
closed nature of the professional campaign consultant business and the easy discernability
of the major campaign themes of the Reagan campaign, to say that the expenditures in
NCPAC would "provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may
prove counterproductive," Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (per curiam), is to
ignore the reality of the political campaign.
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In Buckley, the Court more appropriately recognized the nature of
political campaigns, saying that "[i]t would naively underestimate the in-
genuity and resourcefulness of persons and groups desiring to buy influ-
ence to believe that they would have much difficulty devising
expenditures that skirted the restriction on express advocacy of election
or defeat but nevertheless benefited the candidate's campaign." ' 0 The
ability of political groups to navigate the maze of spending regulations
indicates that the Court is not consistently accepting political reality.
With this understanding, the task remains to develop a system that best
meets the legitimate goals of campaign finance reform. This system must
avoid the pitfalls that have hindered all previous efforts at reform, where
broad statutory schemes have presented the image of effective control
without the reality. Because of the loopholes for narrow, special interest
speech that the Court, through its decisions, has left open, the role of the
political parties in the campaign finance scheme must be examined. An
investigation of the parties' functions indicates that expanding their abil-
ity to support candidates of their choice can provide a rough equality of
spending for legitimate candidates, without giving rise to the threats cre-
ated by narrow, special interest domination of federal campaigns.
III. THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR PLACE
IN AMERICAN CAMPAIGNS
At this point, it is easy to see where the major problems for the cam-
paign finance system lie. While the rise in campaign costs by itself is not
something to fear, the public must be concerned that the amount of spe-
cial interest contributions continues to rise dramatically.2 ' Despite the
apparent rise in the availability of funds, challengers still have a difficult
time raising the money necessary to run a competitive race.2 2 In addi-
tion, the volume of regulations, coupled with the desire of individuals
and groups to spend money on political campaigns, results in a system
210. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45. In NCPAC, Justice White launched a similar attack on
the Court's assumptions about political reality. NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 510 (White, J., dis-
senting). White stated that "[t]he credulous acceptance of the formal distinction between
coordinated and independent expenditures blinks political reality." Id. According to
Justice White, "[t]he candidate cannot help but know of the extensive efforts 'indepen-
dently' undertaken on his behalf. In this realm of possible tacit understandings and im-
plied agreements, I see no reason not to accept the congressional judgment that so-called
independent expenditures must be closely regulated." Id. at 510-11 (White, J., dissent-
ing).
Justice Marshall, joining Justice White in the dissent in NCPAC, argued that
[i]t simply belies reality to say that a campaign will not reward massive financial
assistance provided in the only way that is legally available. And the possibility
of such a reward provides a powerful incentive to channel an independent ex-
penditure into an area that a candidate will appreciate. Surely an eager sup-
porter will be able to discern a candidate's needs and desires; similarly, a willing
candidate will notice the supporter's efforts.
Id at 519-20 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
211. See supra note 150.
212. See infra notes 337, 341-46 and accompanying text.
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where the disclosure laws are not as effective as they could be in a more
streamlined system because groups manipulate the regulatory scheme to
expend all available resources.213 The parties present an avenue of im-
provement for the finance system. The parties possess the potential to
fulfill the goals of FECA while allowing the system to work more in line
with the primary first amendment ideal.
Running a winning campaign at the federal level takes a significant
amount of money that is not easily available to any but the wealthiest
candidates.214 Because the parties can ensure that legitimate candidates
in federal races have a base of funds with which to run their campaigns,
the parties can fulfill the policy goals of both congressional reformers2 '5
and the level-up advocates who argue that the necessity of raising funds
should not make public service an undesirable alternative for otherwise
qualified and capable candidates.216 Party sponsorship may also go a long
way to diminish the potential for corrupting influence from single-inter-
est groups. By lessening the reliance of candidates on money from these
groups and eliminating the limitations on party spending, party sponsor-
ship will meet the goals of those who desire to diminish the role of special
interests in campaigns. In addition, the parties can satisfy those who
argue that the legislature should avoid interfering with the operations of
the political marketplace, while still encouraging a spending system that
facilitates the policies behind both the first amendment and FECA.
From a constitutional viewpoint, the limitations on political party
213. See infra note 259 (discussing soft money).
214. See supra note 150.
215. See Senate Report, supra note 89, at 5592 (FECA "embodies the ... principle
that once someone becomes an unquestionably serious candidate, by virtue of his being a
major party nominee, he should be assured of adequate financing to run a fully informa-
tive and effective campaign.").
216. According to Fleishman and McCorkle,
[a] Level-Up approach.., advocates only the absolute enhancement of political
speech opportunities. This requires the use of public subsidization to establish a
floor of wealth for candidates but no overall ceiling on expenditures from pri-
vate sources of support. Level-Up subsidies do not directly open up the avenues
for more political speech production by ordinary citizens, yet they increase the
speech-wealth of candidates so that a greater quantity and diversity of political
speech can flow to citizen-consumers in the marketplace.
Fleishman & McCorkle, supra note 113, at 230-31.
This theory finds substantial support in Bellotti and Red Lion, which state that it is the
listeners' first amendment interests that are paramount, rather than the speakers. See
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (discussing the first amendment's
role in "affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of infor-
mation and ideas"); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (dis-
cussing the right of the public to receive suitable access to ideas). The Court has also
relied on the benefits to consumers in a number of its cases granting protection to various
forms of commercial speech. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 757, 765 (1976) (striking down state statute
prohibiting the advertising of prescription drug prices); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809,
822, 829 (1975) (upholding newspaper's right to publish advertisement for abortion ser-
vice). This view may be discussed more simply as a right to know principle. See L.
Tribe, supra note 1, at 674-82.
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spending that exist currently under FECA violate the first amend-
ment.217 Allowing the parties to expand their role in federal campaigns
will promote many of the same policies that Congress sought to advance
in the 1974 Act, without raising the constitutional concerns described by
the Supreme Court in Buckley and subsequent cases.
In order to accept the arguments for eliminating the limits on party
spending in federal campaigns, it is necessary to understand the role that
the parties have played in our political and constitutional history. Amer-
ican political parties have a long and checkered history in American poli-
tics. Political parties have existed virtually from the start of the
Republic, despite the strong opposition to parties felt by many of the
Founding Fathers.21 These parties emerged
precisely because individuals realized greater benefit from adhering to
these collective institutions than from acting alone to nominate leaders
or advance policies .... Parties bound people emotionally to leaders
and created a sense of public involvement in government that provided
legitimacy for the institutions of the written constitution. Parties, even
more importantly, developed the institutional means for the coordinat-
ing of elections, of communications between electors and officials, and
of legislative behavior.219
Once the party system developed, it proved to be an effective mechanism
for "aggregating individual interests and resources into coherent pro-
grams-especially in the larger arenas of state and national politics. ' 2
The parties of today differ dramatically from their predecessors. The
parties of the early 1900s relied on mass participation and patronage to
keep the party machinery well-oiled. 21 The local party structure domi-
217. See infra notes 262-311 and accompanying text.
218. The Constitution does not address political parties, and "early post-revolutionary
sentiment disfavored the practice of politics by small cohesive groups." Brisbin, Federal
Courts and the Changing Role of American Political Parties, 5 N. Ill. U.L. Rev. 31, 32
(1984). Accordingly, "[p]artisan politics bears the imprimatur only of tradition, not the
Constitution." Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 369 n.22 (1976). One scholar summarized
the early roots of party regulation as follows:
The first eighty years of this nation's existence was politically a laissez-faire era
during which legislators and judges kept their distance from political parties. A
perusal of state codes in the mid-nineteenth century indicates rather complete
disinterest on the part of lawmakers with the organization and activities of par-
ties. Legislative codes in this era imitated the United States Constitution, which
totally ignores parties. As unregulated private associations, the parties were
presumptively free to organize and function without government supervision.
Fay, The Legal Regulation of Political Parties, 9 J. Legis. 263, 263 (Book 2 1982) (foot-
notes omitted).
219. Brisbin, supra note 218, at 34.
220. Alexander, Political Parties and the Dollar, Soc'y 49, 50 (Jan./Feb. 1985).
221. See Adamany, Political Finance and the American Political Parties, 10 Hastings
Const. L.Q. 497, 513-14 (1983) ("[T]here is recognition among scholars that the pa-
tronage system was the glue that held the political machine together in the heyday of
party strength."). According to Justice Powell, "[p]atronage practices broadened the
base of political participation by providing incentives to take part in the process, thereby
increasing the volume of political discourse in society. Patronage also strengthened par-
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nated American politics; the national party existed merely to nominate a
President and had few additional powers. 222 The party used its local base
and the patronage system to develop a strong loyalty to the party, which
manifested itself in success on election day. 23
Today, by contrast, the parties' social service functions have been sup-
planted by the welfare benefits widely provided by the federal govern-
ment,2 24 and the parties no longer can rely on strong party attachments
for automatic support from the voters.225 Instead, by becoming national
organizations that focus on providing campaign services rather than dis-
tributing the spoils of local government elections, the parties have cre-
ated a new role for themselves over the past decade-one that has made
them the single most important player in the federal campaign
process. 226
The parties have developed their role in federal campaigns through a
renewed focus on party organization and providing political services to
candidates. The parties have developed a centralized structure227 that
ties, and hence encouraged the development of institutional responsibility to the electo-
rate on a permanent basis." Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 379 (1976) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
222. See generally H. Bone, Party Committees and National Politics 197-239 (1958);
C. Cotter & B. Hennessy, Politics Without Power: The National Party Committees
(1964).
223. It is impossible to ignore the detrimental aspects of the political party machines in
the early part of the twentieth century. Despite some arguments that the machines
played a valuable role in our political system, see Merton, The Latent Functions of the
Machine, in Urban Government 223 (E. Banfield ed. 1969); Wolfinger, Why Political
Machines Have Not Withered Away and Other Revisionist Thoughts, 34 J. Pol. 365, 383-85
(1972), the machines clearly presented a significant threat to the legitimate operations of
the democratic system. The role of the party in today's politics has changed to such an
extent, however, that the threats of corruption present with the old local political ma-
chines simply are not present in the operations of today's national party organizations.
See infra notes 224-37 and accompanying text.
224. See X. Kayden & E. Mahe, Jr., The Party Goes On: The Persistence of the Two-
Party System in the United States 45 (1985) (government program providing jobs to gen-
erate voter turnout).
225. The generally accepted view on voter allegiance to parties is that there has been a
"dealignment" in the past decade, rather than any lasting realignment. See generally
Ladd, On Mandates, Realignments and the 1984 Presidential Election, 100 Pol. Sci. Q. 1
(1985); Ladd, The Brittle Mandate: Electoral Dealignment and the 1980 Presidential Elec-
tion, 96 Pol. Sci. Q. 1 (1981); Schneider, Antipartisanship in America, in Parties and De-
mocracy in Britain and America 99 (V. Bogdanor ed. 1984). A "dealignment" occurs
when "voters move away from parties altogether; loyalties to the parties, and to the par-
ties' candidates and programs, weaken, and more and more of the electorate become 'up
for grabs' each election." Ladd, The Brittle Mandate, supra, at 3.
226. The existing party
is a new animal, dependent on different resources, performing different
tasks. . . . It is a professional organization that provides more resources to
campaigns than any other single participant in the electoral process. No indi-
vidual, no group can compete with the party's ability to raise and spend money,
and to provide a host of other services from polling information to press
releases.
X. Kayden and E. Mahe, Jr., supra note 224, at 4.
227. See generally Hadley, The Nationalization of American Politics: Congress, the
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has made the party the most significant provider of campaign funds and
support.22 8 This transition has been a difficult one, and the parties, even
today, are still battling to define fully their role in American politics."z
It is clear, however, that parties today focus their primary attention on
providing campaign services to party candidates.23 °
One constant confronting the parties throughout the twentieth century
has been the prospect of reform of the party system from the outside
through legislation and judicial acts. 31 In the early parts of the twenti-
eth century, reform centered on trying to weaken the often-corrupt as-
pects of local parties.232  A number of these reforms, such as the
Australian ballot, 233 primary elections, and nonpartisan local elections
permanently transformed the parties.234 Perhaps the most influential re-
form in terms of permanently weakening the parties involved the expan-
sion of the Civil Service system, which diminished the ability of the
parties to use patronage as a means of controlling the party machine.2 5
In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the reform movement took a differ-
ent turn, focusing instead on changes in the presidential nominating pro-
Supreme Court, and the National Political Parties, 4 J. Soc. & Pol. Stud. 359 (1979);
Kayden, The Nationalizing of the Party System, in Parties, Interest Groups and Cam-
paign Finance Laws 257 (M. Malbin ed. 1980); Longley, Party Nationalization in
America, in Paths to Political Reform 167 (,V. Crotty ed. 1980).
228. According to Kayden and Mahe:
Today's political party is stronger, not only because it is more professional and
has more money, but because it is now in a relatively better position to influence
the outcomes of elections and the behavior of government than it was before,
and more than any other single actor on the political scene.
X. Kayden & E. Mahe, Jr., supra note 224, at 183.
229. See generally Note, A Brave New Role" The Fall and Rise of American Political
Parties, 23 Harv. J. on Legis. 645 (1986) (authored by Kirk J. Nahra) (describing the new
role of the parties in today's politics). The view of the public towards parties forms one
consideration in defining this role. As one scholar put it, "Americans have denounced
parties in theory, restricted them in legislation, almost eliminated them in reform, and
scorned them in opinion polls. Nevertheless, [they] have continued to employ them, and
even to cherish them, in practice." Pomper, The Contribution of Political Parties to
American Democracy, in Party Renewal in America 1, 4 (G. Pomper ed. 1980). The role
of the party today is not the same as it was earlier in the century, because public attach-
ment to a specific party has weakened dramatically. See sources cited supra at note 225.
Instead, to maintain a prominent place in the American campaign scheme today, a party
must provide effective campaign services.
230. See sources cited infra at note 261 (describing party activities in recent elections).
231. See Fay, supra note 218, at 269 ("To summarize the scope of legislative and judi-
cial controls over parties up to the 1970s would be to describe, with some minor excep-
tions, the weaving of a thicker web of statutory and case law controls over parties and
their activities.").
232. See X. Kayden & E. Mahe, Jr., supra note 224, at 36-44.
233. Prior to the early 1900s, voters would ask for and receive ballots designated by
party. Under this system, ticket-splitting was impossible, as voters could only select the
candidates of one party. The Australian ballot, introduced during the Progressive Era,
was printed by the government, rather than a party, and included candidates of all par-
ties, allowing voters to cast their ballots for candidates from different parties. See id. at
38-39.
234. See id. at 36-44.
235. See id at 44-45.
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cedures. In light of debate at the 1968 Democratic National Convention,
the Democratic Party, through a series of reform commissions, moved to
take the presidential nomination from smoke-filled rooms to a much
broader public forum.23 6 Many commentators believe that these reforms
have weakened the party organizations by reducing the role that the
party plays in selecting the presidential nominee.237
During this reform era, political commentators bemoaned the weak-
ness of American parties. 238 They attribute many of the Watergate
events to the fact that President Nixon's personal campaign committee,
the unfortunately acronymed CREEP, ran the re-election effort, shutting
out the Republican Party establishment in the process. 239 The prognosis
for the weakened parties ranged from slim to terminal, and commenta-
tors emphasized the problems that would be faced by American politics
without a party system.2 °
This was the scene that confronted the parties at the time of the 1974
Act. Historically, the parties largely had escaped federal statutory regu-
lation. 241 Although the parties did become the subject of several impor-
tant court cases, primarily involving equal protection challenges to
various party practices,242 little regulation of the party role in federal
campaigns existed.2 43
236. For a general discussion and description of Democratic Party reforms, see J.
Ceaser, Presidential Selection: The Theory and Development 260-303 (1979); W. Crotty,
Decision for the Democrats: Reforming the Party Structure (1978); N. Polsby, Conse-
quences of Party Reform (1983); B. Shafer, Quiet Revolution: The Struggle for the Dem-
ocratic Party and the Shaping of Post-Reform Politics (1983); S. Wayne, The Road to the
White House: The Politics of Presidential Elections 81-111 (1981).
237. See, e.g., J. Kirkpatrick, Dismantling the Parties: Reflections on Party Reform
and Party Decomposition (1978); Ranney, The Political Parties: Reform and Decline, in
The New American Political System 213 (A. King ed. 1978). Following the 1984 elec-
tion, the Democratic party reform commission concentrated its attention on strengthen-
ing the organization's role in the nomination process. See Cook, Democrats Alter Rules
Slightly in Effort to Broaden Party Base, 1985 Cong. Q. 2158 (1985).
238. See D. Broder, The Party's Over: The Failure of Politics in America (1972); W.
Crotty, American Parties in Decline (2d ed. 1984); E. Ladd, Jr., Where Have All the
Voters Gone? The Fracturing of America's Political Parties (1978).
239. For examples of some of the CREEP abuses, see United States v. Finance Comm.
to Re-elect the President, 507 F.2d 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Ranney, supra note 237, at 241
("The 'Watergate' crimes of 1972-1974 were perpetrated entirely by the nonparty Com-
mittee to Reelect the President.... and the Republican party organization had nothing to
do with them. Indeed, had the party been as powerful as it was in... the 1950s, it might
well have prevented them.") (emphasis in original).
240. According to one overexuberant scholar, "[n]o America without democracy, no
democracy without politics, no politics without parties, no parties without compromise
and moderation." C. Rossiter, Parties and Politics in America 1, 1 (1960).
241. See Mitau, Judicial Determination of Political Party Organizational Autonomy, 42
Minn. L. Rev. 245 (1957); Starr, The Legal Status ofAmerican Political Parties, 1, 34 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 439 (1940); Starr, The Legal Status of American Political Parties, I1, 34
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 685 (1940).
242. See infra note 269.
243. See generally Brisbin, supra note 218, (discussing cases developing constitutional
standards for political parties and defining their role); Fay, supra note 218, at 263-69
(regulation of parties up until 1970s).
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FECA, which imposed widespread regulations on all players in the
political marketplace, changed this approach. By imposing restrictions
ranging from disclosure requirements to spending limitations, FECA
placed important limits on party involvement in federal campaigns. 2"
Although it provided the first important statutory limits on party activ-
ity, the 1974 Act respected the role of parties in American politics by
separating the parties from other political actors and allowing them a
special role in campaigns.245
The party regulations were not a significant concern of the Court in
Buckley.2 This anomaly can probably best be explained by the nature
of the plaintiffs in Buckley-non-party groups who were challenging, in
part, the preferences given to major parties through FECA.247 Accord-
ingly, although the parties' arguments in Buckley did not require this
result,2 48 the Court, for the most part, ignored the parties in its lengthy
analysis.
The system set up by Buckley and its follow-up statute,249 however,
have played a significant part in redefining the parties' role in federal
campaigns. Since the mid-seventies, the political parties have become the
most effective fund-raising sources in American politics by following
FECA's prescription of small contributions from a wide range of
contributors.25°
The parties' fund-raising efforts have proved remarkably successful."
244. See generally Federal Election Commission, Campaign Guide for Political Party
Committees (1984).
245. See Adamany, supra note 221, at 518-19. Among other things, a party can receive
larger contributions from individuals than can non-party committees, see 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(a)(1) (1982), and can give $17,500 directly to senatorial candidates, id. at
§ 441a(h), compared with a $1,000 limitation on what individuals can give directly to
candidates, id. at § 441a(a)(1)(A), and a $5,000 limit on what non-party committees can
give to candidates. Ia at § 441a(a)(2)(A).
246. See Freeman, Political Party Contributions and Expenditures Under the Federal
Election Campaign Act: Anomalies and Unfinished Business, 4 Pace L. Rev. 267, 274-75
(1984).
247. Non-participation by the major parties in significant litigation affecting their
rights has been a recurring pattern in these cases. See Brisbin, supra note 218, at 37. As
a result of this non-participation, "cases were adjudicated and precedents set with con-
cern more for immediate demands of the litigants rather than the long-term constitu-
tional status of American political parties." iaL at 37-8.
248. See Freeman, supra note 246, at 274-75.
249. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 201,
90 Stat. 475 (1976).
250. The Buckley Court recognized that the result of its decision would be "merely to
require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of per-
sons." See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (per curiam). Most of the Republican
party fund-raising success has been built on raising small contributions from a large pool
of donors. See Adamany, Political Parties in the 1980s, in Money and Politics in the
United States: Financing Elections in the 1980s 70, 76 (M. Malbin ed. 1984).
251. For example, during 1982, the two major parties raised more than all the PACs
combined. L. Sabato, PAC Power: Inside the World of Political Action Committees 152
(1984). Receipts for Republican committees at the national level increased from
$45,705,888 in 1976 to $215,049,508 in 1982. By comparison, Democratic committee
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While significantly limited in the direct contributions they can make to
candidates, the parties have used a range of methods to provide funds to
their candidates.252 In addition to the limited direct contributions that
FECA allows and the spending by the national party for general party
themes,2 53 the parties have utilized alternative means of spending addi-
tional money for their candidates. The most important is "coordinated"
spending, which is, essentially, in-kind contributions to candidates, made
by party committees in cooperation with the candidate.2 54 Although lim-
ited by statute,255 these expenditures allow the parties to spend signifi-
cantly more than is permissible through direct expenditures.25 6
The 1979 FECA amendments257 played an important role in strength-
ening the parties' financial reach, and, in the process, created new oppor-
tunities for parties to spend large amounts of money in political
campaigns. Responding to concerns raised about the stability of the par-
ties, Congress intended the 1979 amendments to strengthen the ability of
state and local parties to assist their candidates.258 This incentive was
provided primarily by expanding the opportunity for state and local par-
ties to participate in the financing of federal campaigns. 259
receipts increased from $18,215,374 in 1976 to $39,267,710 in 1982. See N. Ornstein, T.
Mann, M. Malbin, A. Schick, J. Bibby, Vital Statistics on Congress, 1984-85 Edition 83
(1984) [hereinafter Statistics on Congress]. During the 1984 campaigns, the Democratic
committees raised over $71.7 million, while the Republicans raised over $246 million.
132 Cong. Rec. S11325 (Daily ed. Aug. 12, 1986). For additional information on party
financial activity, see Adamany, supra note 221, at 525-30; D. Price, Bringing Back the
Parties 246-49 (1984).
252. See Adamany, supra note 221, at 533-53. Professor Adamany discusses the party
role in providing a wide range of campaign services, including polling, political advertise-
ments, fund-raising advice, get-out-the-vote drives, and political strategy.
253. See infra note 301.
254. See generally Federal Election Commission, Campaign Guide for Political Party
Committees 10-11 (1984) (describing coordinated expenditures).
255. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3) (1982).
256. For example, in 1982 the Democratic Party, at the national level, gave $579,337
directly to candidates for the Senate, while spending $2,265,197 in coordinated expendi-
tures. The Republicans gave $600,221 to its senatorial candidates, while spending
$8,715,761 in coordinated expenditures. See Statistics on Congress, supra note 251, at 84.
257. Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18,
22, 26, & 42 U.S.C. (1982)).
258. See S. Rep. No. 319, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1979); H.R. Rep. No. 422, 96th
Cong., Ist Sess. at 1 (1979).
259. See Adamany, supra note 221, at 521. The 1979 law also allowed the use of "soft
money," which is "defined as contributions made to state or local political parties that are
legal under state law, but would not be legal under federal law, and that can be used for
federal campaign purposes." Barone, Campaign Finance: The System We Have, 486 An-
nals 158, 160 (1986). The use of soft money has been extensive, see Brownstein, Soft
Money, 1985 Nat'l J. 2628 (Dec. 7, 1985), and its use has been criticized extensively. See
Barone, supra, at 160 (problem of soft money is "chief fault of our system today"); 50
Fed. Reg. 477-78 (1985) (Common Cause petition for FEC to promulgate restrictions on
soft money). The FEC rejected the Common Cause petition for restrictions on soft
money because it failed to "present[ ] evidence of instances in which 'soft money' has
been used to influence federal elections sufficient to justify the stringent rules proposed in
its petition." See 51 Fed. Reg. 15915 (1986).
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The direct impact of FECA on the parties is the subject of much de-
bate.2" Certainly, FECA has imposed statutory limits on party spend-
ing. It has also played a role in federal campaigns by providing public
funds to presidential candidates directly, rather than channelling these
funds through the parties and by encouraging the development of alter-
native sources of funds. There is no question, however, that the parties
play a much stronger role in campaigns today than they have in the past
twenty years.26 1 In addition, the parties have adapted to the modem
campaign practices and rules to become the most effective source of
political skills on a permanent basis and, as such, have become an essen-
tial part of most political campaigns.
IV. EXPANDING THE ROLE OF THE PARTIES IS A CONSTITUTIONAL
NECESSITY AND A POLICY IMPERATIVE
Given the role of the parties as it has developed in recent years, sub-
stantial constitutional and policy arguments exist for lifting the limita-
tions on the parties' ability to assist their candidates. Constitutional and
political theory requires that these limitations be struck down and that
parties be able to use their increased ability to participate in federal cam-
paigns to strengthen their role in the political system.
A. The Current Laws Unconstitutionally Restrict the Associational
Rights of the Parties
The limitations on the ability of the political parties to spend on behalf
of their candidates infringe on the associational rights of the parties.2 6 2
260. See; e.g., Commentary of M. Winograd, in Parties, Interest Groups and Cam-
paign Finance Laws 305, 307 (M. Malbin ed. 1980) (most provisions of current federal
law have negative effects on political parties); X. Kayden & E. Mahe, Jr., supra note 224,
at 183 ("Today's political party is stronger, not only because it is more professional and
has more money, but because it is now in a relatively better position to influence the
outcomes of elections and the behavior of government than it was before .. "); Malbin,
What Should Be Done About Independent Campaign Expenditures?, 6 Reg. 41, 45 (1982)
(stating that "[flor the most part, the law has neither helped nor hurt the parties.. ." and
disagreeing with proposals by Herbert Alexander & David Adamany to permit private
contributions to publically-funded presidential candidates in the general election). For a
discussion of the party-PAC relationship, see Sabato, The Political Parties and PAC.-
Novel Relationships in the New System of Campaign Finance, 3 J. L. & Pol. 423 (1987).
261. For discussions of the parties' roles in recent elections, see generally Adamany,
supra note 250, at 95-101, 104-06; Arterton, Political Money and Party Strength, in The
Future of American Political Parties: The Challenge of Governance 101, 104-116 (J.
Fleishman ed. 1982); Bibby, Party Renewal in the National Republican Party, in Party
Renewal in America: Theory and Practice 102 (G. Pomper ed. 1980); Conway, Republi-
can Political Party Nationalization, Campaign Activities, and Their Implications for the
Party System, 13 Publius: The Journal of Federalism 1 (1983); Jacobson, Party Organiza-
tion and Distribution of Campaign Resources Republicans and Democrats in 1982, 100
Pol. Sci. Q. 603 (1985); Sabato, supra note 137.
262. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981)
("[T]he practice of persons sharing common views banding together to achieve a com-
mon end is deeply embedded in the American political process.... Its value is that by
collective effort individuals can make their views known, when, individually, their voices
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The right of association is not absolute, and the Court has been some-
what hesitant in the campaign finance context to reject statutory limita-
tions on contributions and expenditures on associational grounds.2 63 The
Court, however, has been very protective of the associational rights of
political parties, as evidenced by a series of cases dealing with the ability
of political parties to control their own organizations. z 4 The combina-
tion of these holdings with the rationale of the Court's campaign finance
arguments in the context of political parties indicates that the current
restrictions violate the associational rights of the parties.
As the Court has noted, "[t]he right to associate with the political
party of one's choice is an integral part of this basic constitutional free-
dom. 12 65 Thus, "[a]ny interference with the freedom of a party is simul-
taneously an interference with the freedom of its adherents. '266
Moreover, the right of association extends not only to theoretical discus-
sion of political views, but to the more concrete aspects of political con-
trol.267 Still, the Court has struggled to define the constitutional role of
parties and the limits of the parties' associational rights. 68
The cases involving the associational rights of political parties can be
broken down into three general categories. The earliest set of cases in-
volved equal protection challenges to the racist practices of some state
parties in the first half of the twentieth century. 69 In these cases, the
would be faint or lost."); see also id. at 296 (limitation is a restraint on the right of associ-
ation). Associational rights, like those of speech and free press, were "considered by the
Framers of our Constitution to lie at the foundation of a government based upon the
consent of an informed citizenry-a government dedicated to the establishment of justice
and the preservation of liberty." Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23
(1960). Associational rights allowed the speech rights guaranteed by the first amendment
to have substantive meaning, as "[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of
view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association ....
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (citations omitted).
263. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1976) (per curiam); California Medical
Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 197-99 (1981). But see Citizens Against
Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294-99 (1981) (ordinance limiting contri-
butions to committees which favor or oppose ballot measures was struck down as an
impermissible restraint on freedom of association).
264. Most recently, in Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 107 S. Ct. 544
(1986), the Court reviewed a Connecticut law that prevented independent voters from
voting in a party's primary. In Tashjian, the Republican party wanted to open its primary
to independent voters. Id. at 547. The Court struck down the law, stating that "[t]he
Party's attempt to broaden the base of public participation in and support for its activities
is conduct undeniably central to the exercise of the right of association." Id. at 549. See
also cases cited infra at note 279.
265. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973).
266. Sweezy v. New Hampshire ex rel. Wyman, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
267. Cf NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) ("[A]bstract discussion is not the
only species of communication which the Constitution protects; the First Amendment
also protects vigorous advocacy, certainly of lawful ends, against governmental
intrusion.").
268. See cases cited infra notes 269-72.
269. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 374 (1963) (holding that political primaries
constitute state action); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663-64 (1944) (in holding that
a Texas statute regulating primaries constituted state action, Court stated that when
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Court invoked the proscriptions of the fourteenth and fifteenth amend-
ments to limit the abilities of the parties to design their own associa-
tions.27 0 An essential element of these cases consisted of a finding that
the activities of the parties in nominating candidates constituted state
action, therefore bringing the actions within the ambit of the fourteenth
amendment.271 These cases went a long way towards limiting the free-
dom of the parties by restricting their ability to exclude on the basis of
constitutionally improper purposes.
The second set of cases involved access to the ballot. Minor parties
challenged state laws under the equal protection clause, charging alleg-
edly unconstitutional favoritism towards the major parties.272 These de-
cisions struggled to define the constitutional role of the parties but largely
failed, leaving a trail of unclear results and faulty logic. 273 In Williams v.
Rhodes,274 for example, the Supreme Court invalidated an Ohio law that
primaries become part of the machinery for choosing officials, the same tests for deter-
mining character of discrimination or abridgement should be applied to the primary as
are applied to the general election); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941)
(same). "By ruling that political party activities involved state action, the Court nar-
rowed the private character of parties and recognized their public function as an integral
part of the electoral process." Brisbin, supra note 218, at 43.
270. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 376-81 (1963) (equal protection clause prohib-
ited use of Georgia's county-unit system as a basis for counting votes in a primary elec-
tion); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (holding that political primaries that are
part of the machinery for choosing state officials would be considered state action);
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941) (same); Brisbin, supra note 218, at 35
("The development of emphasis on the need to protect minorities from unrestrained ma-
jorities... significantly contributed to increased federal judicial oversight of elections.").
271. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944). The finding of state action,
while usually operating to limit the freedom of political parties, also provides a rationale
for separating the parties from other interest groups in the campaign finance scheme. See
infra text accompanying notes 288-92.
272. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (Ohio statute imposing filing
deadline on independent candidates for President held to have placed an unconstitutional
burden on candidate's supporters); American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (denial
of absentee ballot to minor parties and their candidates violated equal protection clause,
but requirement of nomination by convention, financing scheme of primary elections ex-
cluding small parties, minimum signature provisions and deadlines upheld); Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (upholds statute regulating nomination process of independ-
ent candidates); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) (filing fee requirement unconstitu-
tional as applied to indigent candidate); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968)
(restrictive state election laws held to be invidiously discriminatory and violative of the
equal protection clause because they gave the established parties a decided advantage).
273. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793-94 (1983) ("A burden that falls
unequally on new or small political parties... impinges, by its very nature, on associa-
tional choices protected by the First Amendment."); American Party v. White, 415 U.S.
767, 781 (1974) (" 'statutes create many classifications which do not deny equal protec-
tion; it is only "invidious discrimination" which offends the Constitution.' " (quoting Fer-
guson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963))); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)
(no "litmus-paper test" to determine constitutionality of election law provisions); Lubin
v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718 (1974) (conflict exists between providing access to ballot and
maintaining integrity of election system); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 34 (1968)
("[Tihe number of voters in favor of a party, along with other circumstances, is relevant
in considering whether state laws violate the Equal Protection Clause.").
274. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
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made it "virtually impossible" '275 for any candidate to gain access to the
ballot unless she was a candidate of the Republican or Democratic party.
Prior to Williams, the Court had not allowed a non-racial claim of dis-
crimination to stand.2 7 6 Accordingly, Williams "swept away precedent
by allowing challenges to state ballot access laws that allegedly violated
the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment. ' 277 Again,
these cases limited the ability of the state to design electoral systems that
excluded parties or others from the ballot in violation of the speech and
associational rights of the excluded person.278
The third set of cases involved the ability of the national parties to
control the state parties in the context of the associational rights of the
national parties.279 One result of these cases has been an expansion of
the ability of the national parties to control the activities of the state and
local parties.28 ° In these cases, the exclusionary issue was somewhat dif-
ferent. The Court allowed the party, at the national level, to prefer its
own rules over those of the state where the individuals who would be
excluded had, in effect, chosen to play by the rules of the national
party.
2 8 1
275. Id. at 25.
276. Brisbin, supra note 218, at 44.
277. Id. at 44.
278. The Court has continued to struggle with defining the legitimate role of the state
in protecting the integrity of the ballot and preventing voter confusion while still allowing
adequate access to the political system for minor parties. See Munro v. Socialist Workers
Party, 107 S. Ct. 533, 538 (1986) (state's interest in restricting access to general ballot
outweighed burden on first amendment rights of minority party candidates). These cases
are relevant primarily for defining the limits of governmental action designed to foster a
two-party system. The arguments advocated in this Article will benefit those parties with
significant funds to spend on party candidates. The effect of these arguments will be to
benefit the Republican and Democratic parties at this point in time, but, because other
parties will have the opportunity to spend when they have available funds, no problems of
unequal treatment among parties will be present. Cf Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,
31-34 (1968) (rejecting Ohio's system for ballot access because it protected two particular
parties). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-108 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding
the public financing provisions for the presidential race, that provided funds primarily to
major party candidates).
279. See Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S.
107 (1981); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1
(1972); see also Ripon Soc'y v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 588 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (delegate allocation formula fixed by national party does not violate equal protec-
tion clause), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976).
280. See Democratic Party, 450 U.S. at 123-24; Cousins, 419 U.S. at 489-90; O'Brien,
409 U.S. at 5. This development in the cases has coincided with, and contributed to, the
increased nationalization of the party system, which has been a major factor in the in-
creased strength of the parties over the past decade. See supra text accompanying notes
225-29.
281. These cases were often decided in a very rapid fashion, often in the context of an
upcoming political convention. In Cousins v. Wigoda, 409 U.S. 1201 (1972), which in-
volved a credentials challenge in the 1972 presidential nomination process, Justice Rehn-
quist, sitting as circuit justice, refused to call a special session of the Supreme Court to
consider the issue, leaving the legal questions to the convention itself. 409 U.S. at 1205.
Later, the full Court reconsidered the decision without making any significant changes.
See Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 491 (1975). For the most part, these decisions
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These cases display a somewhat inconsistent view of the role of the
parties when an evaluation of the associational claims of parties is in-
volved. A general result may be that the Court has forced the parties to
be inclusive, in terms of allowing all interested persons to participate in
party activities, but, in return, has given the parties broad leeway to
structure their own internal activities.2" 2 The Court has balanced several
competing considerations. An important concern has been to give the
voters a choice of candidates. Hence, the Court has been inclined to al-
low minor parties and independent candidates a reasonable opportunity
to participate on the ballot.2" 3 The Court, however, has recognized a
legitimate interest of the state in controlling the size of the ballot and
preserving the integrity of elections and has, therefore, allowed some re-
strictions to remain."' Thus, while the Court has allowed the major par-
ties some leeway, the extent of permissible discrimination against minor
parties remains unclear.
The campaign finance issues throw an additional twist into this con-
fused scenario, as the limits on party spending reduce the ability of par-
ties to participate in elections through support of their candidates. To
date, the Court has not looked kindly on associational claims of groups
in campaign finance cases. 285 The Court has combined its contribution/
expenditure distinction with the ability of various political groups to ex-
press fully their views through independent expenditures to conclude
that there has been no infringement of associational rights.286
Such arguments, however, will not work in the context of political par-
ties. The inability of the parties to make independent expenditures
makes their associational arguments stronger, while the inclusionary na-
ture of the parties minimizes the threat of corruption that causes the
Court to uphold limits in the first instance. In the campaign laws and in
our political history, parties have been granted a well-deserved special
presence in our political system. The inclusive aspects of the Supreme
Court cases, which mandate an open policy for the parties, coincide with
the generally inclusive nature of American parties throughout their
reflect a reluctance on the part of the Court to interfere with the operations of the na-
tional political conventions. See Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex reL
La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 124 (1981); Note, "It's My Party and I'll Cry If!I Want To'"-
State Intrusions Upon the Associational Freedoms of Political Parties-Democratic Party
of the United States v. Wisconsin ex reL La Follette, 1983 Wisc. L. Rev. 211 (1983).
282. The most recent case in this area presents a slightly different issue. In Tashjian v.
Republican Party of Connecticut, 107 S. Ct. 544 (1986), the state Republican party de-
sired to allow independent voters to participate in its primaries. Stating that "[t]he
Party's determination of the boundaries of its own association, and of the structure which
best allows it to pursue its political goals, is protected by the Constitution," the Court
struck down the Connecticut ban on open primaries. Id. at 554.
283. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (holding that Ohio's early filing
deadline for independent presidential candidates imposed an unconstitutional burden).
284. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 715 (1974) (state has "interest in keeping its
ballots within manageable, understandable limits").
285. See supra note 263.
286. See id
1987]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
existence.287
This inclusive nature of American parties represents only one of the
areas that distinguishes the parties from other groups in the political
spectrum. The parties form the only group that is allowed to nominate
candidates for elections. Because of this focus on electoral activity, 288 the
parties are forced to look for ways of attracting as many people as possi-
ble to the party's slate of candidates.289 As one scholar argues, the major
differences between parties and other interest groups fall into five catego-
ries: the extent to which parties pursue their organizational activities
through contesting elections; the breadth and inclusiveness of the party
organization and membership; the sole concentration of the parties on
political activities for achieving their goals; the demonstrated stability
and longevity of the parties; and the strength of the parties as cues and
reference symbols for the electorate at large.29°
In addition to the above differences from other groups operating in the
political marketplace, the parties represent the only organizations that
play so significant a role in American elections that they may be deemed
state actors. 291 As state actors in some contexts, the parties stand sepa-
rate from other political groups, and the responsibilities and duties that
this status brings justify different constitutional treatment as well.292
Despite these significant differences, the parties remain the only polit-
ical actors not allowed the freedom to spend as they wish in support of
their candidates.2 93 Allowing the parties to participate more fully in
287. See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 769 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting)
("Political parties in this country traditionally have been characterized by a fluidity and
overlap of philosophy and membership."); see also Democratic Party of United States v.
Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 131 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("It can
hardly be denied that [the Democratic] ... Party generally has been composed of various
elements reflecting most of the American political spectrum." (footnote omitted)).
288. See Winter, "The New Age of Political Reform". Looking Back, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 1,
4-5 (1980) ("For parties, winning elections is the principal goal.... Where the political
party is concerned, there is generally no substitute for victory.").
289. See F. Sorauf, Party Politics in America 16 (5th ed. 1984) ("The political parties,
in order to win elections, must depend less on the intricate skills and maneuverings of
organizational strategists and more on the mobilization of large numbers of citizens.").
Similarly, "[p]arty appeals must be broad and inclusive; the party cannot afford either
exclusivity or a narrow range of concerns." Id. at 16.
290. See F. Sorauf, supra note 289, at 15-18. As discussed infra in the text accompany-
ing notes 312-35, the inclusiveness and necessary breadth of the parties' interests indicate
that the party cannot present the threat of corruption necessary to justify limitations on
the speech rights of parties in campaigns because the parties cannot make the kind of
quidpro quo arrangements with candidates that meet the Court's definition of corruption.
For the Court's definition of political corruption, see supra note 191 and accompanying
text.
291. See Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1975); O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S.
1, 4-5 (1972) (per curiam).
292. The state action issue for political parties is a complicated one. The party is a
state actor only in certain circumstances, and the extent of these circumstances is not
clear. See Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 492-96 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring);
O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1972).
293. FEC regulations prevent the parties from engaging in independent expenditures
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electing candidates, however, would have the effect of strengthening the
party organizations to the benefit of the political system and the electo-
rate at large.294 In addition, the differences between parties and other
groups and the special place of the parties in our constitutional structure
indicate that the associational claims of the parties should be given
greater weight. The parties, therefore, have a stronger associational
claim than, for example, political action groups.2" Accordingly, given
the special characteristics of parties and their special place in our consti-
tutional and political system, the current restrictions on the parties abil-
ity to participate in elections infringes on the associational rights of the
party members, as the parties do not have sufficient alternative outlets
available for the expression of party views.29 6 A functioning democracy
must encourage people to associate-to spread their ideas through the
political marketplace, but restrictions on group spending do not allow
these associations to be realized fully.
B. Current Laws Unconstitutionally Discriminate Based on the
Content of Party Speech
The campaign laws as they currently exist also infringe on the first
amendment rights of parties because they constitute an impermissible
content discrimination in the area of political speech,29 7 an area where
content discrimination is given strict scrutiny.
Given the concerns with government involvement in limiting political
speech, the current campaign finance laws involving parties constitute
impermissible content discrimination.298 Despite the confusion sur-
involving candidates. 11 C.F.R. § 110.7(b)(4) (1986). Similarly, while the parties can
spend unlimited amounts to support general party and party-building themes, they are
not able to spend as they wish on behalf of specific candidates. Cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 28 (1976) (per curiam) (limitations on contributions acceptable where they leave
individuals and groups free to spend independently as they wish to support or oppose
candidates). See also infra at note 302.
294. See infra text accompanying note 349.
295. An example of such a political action group was that formed by the California
Medical Association (CMA). The CMA was an unincorporated association of approxi-
mately 25,000 California doctors who had formed a political action committee to express
their views. See California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 185
(1981).
296. The arguments regarding the parties' rights of association cannot be separated
completely from the free speech arguments, as "[t]he two rights overlap and blend; to
limit the right of association places an impermissible restraint on the right of expression."
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 300 (1981).
297. Political speech is clearly protected under the first amendment:
Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment,
there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amend-
ment was to protect the free discussion of.. . candidates, structures and forms
of government, the manner in which [the] government is operated or should be
operated, and all such matters relating to political processes.
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966).
298. The principle that government may not engage in content discrimination is one
that is often repeated by the Supreme Court, but it is a principle that has little continuing
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rounding the reach of this principle, the Court remains concerned with
laws that distinguish among types of speech based on the content of the
speech. Most allowable content discrimination has involved speech that
somehow deserves less constitutional protection than prototypical first
amendment speech.299
The political speech engaged in by political parties, however, cannot be
considered unprotected speech or speech that is deserving of anything
less than the fullest first amendment protection.3" The laws sharply dis-
criminate against the parties, however, on the basis of the content of their
speech. For example, the parties can engage in unlimited speech as long
as the speech is restricted to general party themes or party-building activ-
ities.301 As soon as the parties begin to speak about specific candidates,
however-either their own or the opposing parties' 3° 2-the expenditure
vitality as Supreme Court doctrine. See generally Stephan, The First Amendment and
Content Discrimination, 68 Va. L. Rev. 203, 205 (1982) ("Despite its repeated invocations
of a near-absolute content neutrality rule, the Court has not followed its own precept.");
Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 189-90
(1983) (discussing how the Court differentiates between "content-based" and "content-
neutral" restrictions and how it employs "two quite distinct modes of analysis" in assess-
ing the relative constitutionality of each type). In a wide range of areas, ranging from
obscenity, see, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), to commercial speech, see, e.g., Posadas De
P. R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P. R., 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986); Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447 (1978); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976),
the Court has engaged in a different analysis for statutes that explicitly discriminate on
the basis of particular types of speech. In Renton, the Court found that an ordinance
restricting placement of adult theaters was a "valid governmental response to the 'admit-
tedly serious problems' created by adult theaters," 106 S. Ct. at 932, and in Young, the
Court held that "the State may legitimately use the content of [obscene] materials as the
basis for placing them in a different classification from other motion pictures." 427 U.S.
at 70-71. In the commerical speech cases, however, the Court maintained that commeri-
cal speech is indeed protected but that there is a need for regulation in order to further
the state's interest in the protection of the public. See, e.g., Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2976-
77; Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 566.
299. As the Supreme Court has noted,
there are categories of communication and certain special utterances to which
the majestic projection of the First Amendment does not extend because they
'are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.'
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
300. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) ("First Amendment
affords the broadest protection to... political expression"); see also Freeman, supra note
246, at 288 ("To restrict [the parties'] ... ability to support their candidates is to restrict
the only form of political expression that has any meaning to a major political party.").
301. Because the term "expenditure" is defined by statute to include only those pay-
ments "made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal of-
fice," 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A)(i) (1982), the parties can spend unlimited amounts for
messages, such as a "vote Republican" message, that do not attempt to influence a spe-
cific federal election.
302. In Democratic Congressional Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n,
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limitations imposed by FECA are triggered.30 3
In First National Bank v. Bellotti,3° the Court struck down similar
content discrimination. The Court said that the first amendment prohib-
its legislation in the protected speech area.30 s The Court, therefore,
struck down the restrictions in that case as impermissible legislative
prohibitions.30 6 Similarly, the restrictions on spending by parties are
based on specifically what the parties can say and how they can say it,
which is impermissible under the first amendment. Therefore, the spend-
ing limitations as they now stand must be struck down as impermissible
content-regulation.
C. The Constitution Requires that Parties be Able to Spend
for Their Candidates as Individuals Can Spend
on Their Own Campaigns
The Court in Buckley strongly rejected the notion that a candidate
could be statutorily limited in what he could contribute or spend on be-
half of his own candidacy. 0 7 The language rejecting this portion of
645 F. Supp. 169 (D.D.C. 1986), the Democratic Congressional Committee sought review
of an FEC decision to dismiss a complaint related to spending by the National Republi-
can Congressional Committee (NRCC). The NRCC had paid for a series of mailings to
the constituents of Congressman Fernand St. Germain, referring to allegations that the
Congressman had amassed a personal fortune through use of his position. Id. at 170.
The district court held that the Federal Election Commission had erred in finding that
this speech would not be counted against the party's expenditure limitations in federal
campaigns. IaL at 174. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, af-
firming in part, agreed that the FEC needed to explain its dismissal of the complaint, but
reversed the district court's denial of the merits of the claim and remanded for considera-
tion of the merits. See Democratic Congressional Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 831 F.2d 1131, 1134-35 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
If the district court's view becomes the accepted one, the party, once it has reached its
limit on spending, could be prevented completely from criticizing the activity of Con-
gressman St. Germain-in apparently flagrant violation of the first amendment rights
affirmed in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 0964). The ability of the parties to
express views on elected officials would be severely circumscribed. This view, if it stands,
would also violate the associational rights of the parties, as it would strongly curtail the
ability of the party organization to express its views on political issues.
303. Some courts have interpreted provisions of FECA in a way that might allow a
broad construction of when party speech involves specific candidates. Such an interpreta-
tion would further diminish the speech opportunities of the political parties. See. eg.,
Federal Election Comm'n v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 108 S. Ct.
151 (1987).
304. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
305. Id at 784-85 ("In the realm of protected speech, the legislature is constitutionally
disqualified from dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers
who may address a public issue.... Such power in government to channel the expression
of views is unacceptable under the First Amendment." (citation omitted)).
306. The restrictions "amount[ed] to an impermissible legislative prohibition of speech
based on the identity of the interests that spokesmen may represent in public debate over
controversial issues and a requirement that the speaker have a sufficiently great interest in
the subject to justify communication." Id at 784.
307. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
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FECA was possibly the strongest in the lengthy opinion." 8 Accordingly,
given the nature of political parties, a party constitutionally cannot be
limited in what it can spend on behalf of its own candidates.
American parties are little more than loose confederations of similarly-
thinking people.3 9 Given the diversity of political thought inherent in
the nature of the party, which must elect candidates to achieve party
goals, the party has no intrinsic existence outside of its candidates, as the
party can fulfill its goals and express its opinions only through its candi-
dates.31 0 Accordingly, spending for its candidates should be equated, for
constitutional purposes, with a candidate spending on her own behalf.
Therefore, allowing the party to spend unlimited amounts for its candi-
dates would not in any way affect the amount of corruption in the electo-
ral process. As with the use of personal funds, the use of party funds
"reduces the candidate's dependence on outside contributions and
thereby counteracts the coercive pressures and attendant risks of abuse to
which the Act's contribution limitations are directed." 31 The limits on
party spending, therefore, should be struck down on these grounds.
D. The Parties Do Not Present the Threat of Corruption Required to
Infringe on First Amendment Rights
As the Court reemphasized in Federal Election Commission v. National
Conservative Political Action Committee,31 2 preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption is the only legitimate rationale for limiting the
exercise of fundamental first amendment rights in the campaign con-
text. 313 In many ways, the Court's decision to employ a narrow definition
of corruption has been a dominant reason for Congress' inability to
strengthen the election laws along the lines of the level-down position.
Despite ample opportunity to develop a broader definition of "corrup-
tion," the Court has only defined corruption as an explicit quid pro quo
arrangement. 314 This definition places significant limits on Congress'
ability to regulate contributions and independent expenditures-what
many see as the most pervasive influence in the political system. Within
this narrow definition, the parties do not present a sufficient threat of
corruption to justify such limits on party activity.
The Court has not looked kindly on claims of corruption as a rationale
for finance regulation. While the Court at times has paid lip service to
potential corruption claims, 315 NCPAC basically eliminated the possibil-
ity of using corruption as a rationale for limiting the exercise of first
308. See Polsby, supra note 7, at 26.
309. See supra note 287.
310. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
311. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 53 (1976) (per curiam) (footnote omitted).
312. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U.S. 480 (1985).
313. Id. at 500-01.
314. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
315. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197,
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amendment freedoms, except to bar the most blatant, explicit arrange-
ments of money for specific votes.316 The Court has chosen to ignore
what the level-down advocates see as the corrupting influence of money
generally in the political process.
In NCPAC, the Court was confronted with the issue of corruption sur-
rounding the massive expenditures of NCPAC in the election efforts of
President Reagan. In Buckley, the Court explicitly held that independ-
ent expenditures 317 could not be limited constitutionally. 318 Later, the
Court upheld expenditure limitations in the presidential race because of
the availability of public financing. 319 Thus, the major issue in NCPAC
was whether the independent expenditure rationale of Buckley would
govern or whether the limitations on first amendment rights allowed in
the presidential race would prevent NCPAC's expenditures.
With a different lead player, NCPA C could have been an easy case. As
FECA existed, it made illegal the independent expenditure of more than
$1,000 in the presidential race.320 Because the statutory spending level
was so low compared to the financial ability of so many political groups
across the country, enforcing this prohibition would have suppressed a
wide range of valuable speech.321 While NCPAC was perceived to be a
greater evil because of the potential size of its financial involvement in
federal elections, the $1,000 limit would have excluded speech from state
and local groups across the country because the statutory limitation did
not differentiate between speakers.322 Given the wide range of possible
expression that this legislation outlawed, the Court clearly was justified
209-10 (1982); California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 197-
99 (1981).
316. See Note, Campaign Contributions and Federal Bribery Law, 92 Harv. L Rev. 451
(1978) (discussing the relation between FECA and bribery law). For a strong critique of
the Court's position in this area, see Weeks, Bribes. Gratuities and the Congress The
Institutionalized Corruption of the Political Process, the Impotence of Criminal Law to
Reach It, and a Proposal for Change, 13 J. of Legis. 123 0986).
317. For the definition of "independent expenditures," see supra note 187 and accom-
panying text.
318. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-51 (1976) (per curiam); accord Federal Elec-
tion Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985)
(independent expenditures "produce speech at the core of the First Amendment").
319. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F. Supp. 280
(S.D.N.Y.), afl'd mem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
320. NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 482.
321. As the Buckley Court noted in striking down the S1,000 independent expenditure
limitation, the purchase of "one full-page advertisement in a daily edition of a certain
metropolitan newspaper" cost almost $7,000 in 1975. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20 n.20.
322. A "political committee" was defined by the NCPAC Court to be "any committee,
association, or organization (whether or not incorporated) which accepts contributions or
makes expenditures for the purpose of influencing, or attempting to influence, the nomi-
nation or election of one or more individuals to Federal, State, or local elective public
office." 26 U.S.C. § 9002(9) (1982). Therefore, the Court found that the statute "appl[ied]
equally to an informal neighborhood group that solicits contributions and spends money
on a Presidential election as to the wealthy and professionally managed PACs involved in
this case." NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 496.
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in invalidating the law on constitutional grounds.323
However, the facts of the case complicated the issue. NCPAC was not
a small association of local individuals who had banded together to buy a
full-page ad in the local newspaper. Instead, NCPAC was a multimillion
dollar, nationwide organization that had the potential to play a signifi-
cant role in elections across the country.3 2" Because independent ex-
penditures on the Democratic side were negligible in comparison,325
NCPAC's spending threatened to disrupt the carefully designed equality
in spending. These facts would have made it politically feasible to up-
hold the law as applied in the case, leaving the constitutional flaws in this
result to be remedied when a more attractive challenger to the statute
ultimately came along. Nevertheless, the Court invalidated the law.32 6
Putting aside these aspects of the case, an easy way for the Court to
have upheld the statute in this case would have been to find that the
NCPAC expenditures were not really "independent," as required by the
campaign laws. At trial, the district court rejected the admissibility of
evidence as to the "independence" of these expenditures, a decision that
was supported by the Supreme Court.327 In fact, as Justice White
pointed out in dissent, it "blinks political reality" to think that a presi-
dential candidate would not be aware of and appreciate the expenditure
of the funds.328 Because the world of campaign consultants is a relatively
closed one, the Court simply is not accepting reality when it argues that
there was no coordination between NCPAC and the presidential cam-
323. The NCPAC Court recognized the problems with the small limitation:
[F]or purposes of presenting political views in connection with a nationwide
Presidential election, allowing the presentation of views while forbidding the
expenditure of more than $1,000 to present them is much like allowing a speaker
in a public hall to express his views while denying him the use of an amplifying
system.
NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 493. In Buckley, the Court noted that "[b]eing free to engage in
unlimited political expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures is like being free to
drive an automobile as far and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline."
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 n.18. Both analogies seem apt.
324. See Ornstein, supra note 251, at 87-88, 92-93 (detailing extent of NCPAC contri-
butions in recent elections).
325. See Novak and Cobb, The Kindness of Strangers, 13 Common Cause 32, 35
(Sept./Oct. 1987).
326. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480, 501 (1985). A less intuitively appealing constitutional claim would have
been presented if the statutory limit on independent expenditures had reflected some rea-
sonable amount of spending. Although the constitutional issues would have been exactly
the same, the Court most likely would have found it easier to uphold a $1 million spend-
ing limit, for example, which would have given groups of all kinds a reasonable ability to
express themselves regarding the presidential race.
327. See NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 499. The Court did seem to recognize the potential for
corruption because of the size of the expenditures involved, but it stated that the statute
was "fatally overbroad" because it applied to "informal discussion groups that solicit
neighborhood contributions to publicize their views about a particular Presidential candi-
date." NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 498.
328. See NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 510 (White, J., dissenting).
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paign in this case.329
The NCPAC Court's finding that the spending limits were not justified
makes it very difficult for the government to prove "corruption" aside
from the most blatant kinds of bribery. Given the Court's cavalier treat-
ment of the corruption claims in NCPAC, the Court is not likely to find
the kind of corruption in unlimited party spending that would justify the
current statutory limits on the ability of parties to spend in support of
their candidates.33°
Under current Federal Election Commission regulations, political par-
ties cannot spend independently on behalf of specific candidates.331 This
regulation reflects the presumption by the FEC that parties are so in-
volved with their candidates that they could not possibly meet the re-
quirements for independence.332 As a result, the parties constitute the
only political groups that do not have the opportunity to spend unlimited
amounts of money in support of candidates.333
In addition, the corruption rationale that has allowed the Court to
uphold limits in specific cases simply is not applicable in the case of polit-
ical parties. The parties, through their nomination procedures, select a
candidate within the electoral district to represent the party in the gen-
eral election. This ability to run candidates is what sets the parties apart
from the myriad of other groups involved in the political process. Ac-
cordingly, it is impossible for the parties to "corrupt" the candidates they
have chosen, in any kind of general sense, because the candidate has been
chosen, at least to some extent, on the basis of his or her agreement with
the prevailing party views. Additionally, as required by NCPAC and
329. Again, while the constitutional issues would have been the same, there would be a
much diminished risk of actual cooperation if the group in question had been a small,
community organization that had no connection with national political circles. It is this
type of speech that the Court apparently desired to protect, and it found that it had to
allow the speech of NCPAC, which presented a much greater risk of actual or implicit
cooperation, to do so.
330. The lack of sufficient possibilities of corruption supports the argument that the
party should be treated as an individual spending on her own campaign. See supra notes
307-11 and accompanying text.
331. 11 C.F.R. § 110.7(b)(4) 0986).
332. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
333. Because of the proscription against independent party expenditures, the FEC cre-
ated the category of "coordinated expenditures" so that the parties would be able to
spend above the minimal statutory amounts. Coordinated expenditures are basically in-
kind contributions from party committees to candidates. See Federal Election Commis-
sion, Campaign Guide for Political Party Committees 10-11 (1984). While the coordinated
expenditure amounts are substantial in comparison to the amounts allowed in direct con-
tributions to candidates, they are strictly limited by statute. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d) (1982).
Here again, the parties are receiving unique treatment, as they are the only groups that
are allowed this category of expenditures.
Allowing coordinated expenditures, however, does not fully protect the ability of the
political parties to exercise their protected first amendment rights. Cf Polsby, supra note
7, at 24 ("At least where the possibility of independent expenditure is preserved, limits on
contribution do not impose unacceptable burdens on 'true' political speech."). For polit-
ical parties, support of individual candidates is the only way for the parties to achieve
their goals in the political process.
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other cases, the party is really incapable of making the specific quid pro
quo arrangements that the Court has required to find the threat of
corruption.334
Parties can be separated from most other political participants by the
nature of their interests in the political process. Unlike the PACs, which
arouse most of the suspicion in the political arena, the parties cannot be
strictly ideological or narrowly bound to specific views because their in-
terest lies in the ability of their candidates to win office rather than in any
specific ideological proposition. Thus, the parties cannot pose a threat of
corruption as the Court has narrowly defined it.335
E. Lifting Limits on Party Spending Will Produce a Level
of Equality in Campaigns
While the Court clearly has rejected the arguments of the level-down
advocates that expenditure limits should be imposed to equalize spending
in federal campaigns, 331 this goal of equalizing spending still has substan-
tial appeal as a policy aim to be achieved within the boundaries set by the
Supreme Court. One of the key components of this issue today is the
incumbent/challenger spending disparity that exists in many races be-
cause an overwhelming percentage of PAC contributions go to incum-
bent candidates. 337 If the spending limitations are dropped, the parties
will provide a means for bringing this policy goal to fruition in a fashion
that Supreme Court jurisprudence will allow.338
334. The NCPAC Court stated that
[t]he fact that candidates and elected officials may alter or reaffirm their own
positions on issues in response to political messages paid for by the PACs can
hardly be called corruption, for one of the essential features of democracy is the
presentation to the electorate of varying points of view.
Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S.
480, 498 (1985). Following this logic, the parties could not be accused of corrupting a
candidate who had chosen to accept party sponsorship, for purposes of running her cam-
paign. Similarly, "[i]t would be difficult under any but the most extreme circumstances
for a party to refuse resources to a party incumbent, despite his independence on many
policy issues." Adamany, supra note 250, at 112.
335. Based solely on a corruption analysis, it might be constitutionally permissible to
limit party contributions and expenditures to candidates in primary elections, as it is in
these elections that the party has the power to exercise more control over its candidates.
Once the candidate has been nominated by the party, the party's interest shifts away from
any ideological tests to winning the race. The arguments presented in this Article focus
on general election campaigns.
336. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam).
337. See supra note 150 and infra note 342. Incumbents use their ability to raise funds
from PACs to build campaign war chests, even when they are in relatively uncontested
races. The amount of these war chests becomes a factor in keeping many challengers out
of the race. See Jackson, New Congress Relied Heavily on PAC Donations, But Much of
Spending Had Little Effect on Results, Wall St. J., Dec. 24, 1986, at 32, col. 1. Following
the 1986 elections, House incumbents maintained aggregate funds of approximately $51
million in unspent contributions. Id.
338. The Supreme Court has shown some willingness to allow an interpretation of
FECA that permits the parties to play a larger role. In Federal Election Comm'n v.
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27 (1981), the Court upheld an FEC
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The party treasuries can ensure that competent candidates have the
money necessary to run legitimate campaigns. Because "[i]t is a travesty
to perpetuate a system of campaign finance that permits the unlimited
expenditure of a candidate's personal funds at the same time that it sig-
nificantly limits sources of funding for other participants, '339 the parties
can and should be used to allow all party candidates to run legitimate
campaigns. Given that "[c]ompetition in ideas and governmental poli-
cies is at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment
freedoms, ' '34 the creation of a spending floor that ensures candidates a
minimum amount of funds is probably the most important policy goal in
the campaign context today.
The ability of the parties to provide a floor of funds for their candi-
dates can diminish challenger concerns about raising sufficient funds to
run a competitive campaign. According to Professor Jacobson, the
amount of money that the challenger has to spend in his or her race is
probably the most important variable in congressional campaigns." In-
cumbent Congressmen have ready access to both funds and publicity be-
cause of their incumbent status. 342 With this status, re-election rates for
incumbents have remained at extremely high rates since FECA was en-
acted.343 Accordingly, "money is a particularly important campaign re-
source for nonincumbent candidates." 3 " Similarly, money is not an
especially important factor for incumbents in most races.? 5 Thus, in-
interpretation of section 441a(d) that allowed the National Republican Senatorial Cam-
paign Committee to act as the agent of state parties in making expenditures on behalf of
federal candidates. The Court stated that this provision "fits into the general scheme by
assuring that political parties will continue to have an important role in federal elec-
tions." Id at 41 (footnote omitted).
339. Mathias, supra note 143, at 68.
340. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968).
341. See G. Jacobson, supra note 59, at 49.
342. Perhaps the most disturbing fund-raising statistic today is the disparity in receipts
from PACs between challengers and incumbents. From 1977-78 to 1985-86, the percent-
age of PAC funds received by incumbents has increased steadily from 61% to 81% for
House races. Cohen, Incumbent Money, 1986 National Journal 2812 (Nov. 15, 1986).
One-third of all PACs gave 80% or more of their contributions to incumbents in the 1986
elections. Total PAC spending in the 1986 elections amounted to S138.1 million, with
$95.1 million going to incumbents. See Common Cause Study (Sept. 4, 1987).
343. In 1986, re-election rates for incumbent Representatives reached record highs, as
98% of those seeking re-election were successful. Calmes, House Incumbents Achieve
Record Success Rate in 1986, 1986 Cong. Q. 2891. In addition, 85% of these candidates
won with at least 60% of the vote or had no major party opposition at all. Id. From 1950
to 1982, the re-election rate for incumbent Representatives never went below 86.6% and
reached a high of 96.8% in 1968 that was almost equalled by the 1976 figure of 95.8%.
Ornstein, supra note 251, at 49-50. Between 1966 and 1982, more than 66.4% of incum-
bents seeking re-election received more than 60% of the major party vote. Id. at 53. For
Senators, the rates are significantly lower, reaching a low of 55.2% in 1980, but the rates
reached a high of 96.6% in 1960 and hit 93.3% in 1982. Id at 51.
344. G. Jacobson, supra note 59, at 49. Challenger's shares of the votes increase ap-
proximately three percentage points for every $100,000 spent. See Jacobson, The Repub-
lican Advantage in Campaign Finance, in The New Direction in American Politics 143,
149 (J. Chubb and P. Peterson eds. 1985).
345. "Incumbents do not seem to benefit from campaign spending to anywhere near
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creasing the funds available to challengers will have the effect of increas-
ing competition for congressional seats.34 6
Because of the financial clout wielded by the political parties, they can
provide a means of ensuring that legitimate candidates have a base of
funds sufficient to run a competitive campaign. 347 Lifting the limitations
on party spending will allow the parties to fulfill many of the equality
goals of both the level-down and level-up advocates without raising the
constitutional concerns expressed by the Supreme Court.348
the same degree [as challengers]. The more they spend, the worse they do; with chal-
lenger spending controlled, their spending has little apparent effect on the vote." G.
Jacobson, supra note 59, at 49.
346. See generally Jacobson, Public Funds for Congressional Campaigns: Who Would
Benefit, in Political Finance 99, 103-124 (H. Alexander ed. 1979).
347. One political issue that will confront any congressional action in this direction is
the current disparity in fund-raising ability between the two major parties. Whether this
gap will ever close is, of course, unclear. There are strong arguments, however, that the
Republican advantage in fund-raising is a temporary situation, resulting from a decade-
long head start for the Republicans in direct mail fund-raising and a temporary surge in
fund-raising stemming from the Reagan presidency. See Mathias, supra note 143, at 73
("Although parity does not now exist between the two major parties in fund-raising abil-
ity, it will no doubt come to pass before the decade is out.").
348. Some commentators, such as former Senator Charles Mathias, advocate public
financing for all federal campaigns on a scale like that already provided for in the presi-
dential races. Under this system, private contributions would play no role in the financing
of candidate campaigns. See Mathias, supra note 143, at 71-72; see also Wertheimer,
supra note 143, at 90. Other commentators, such as Professor Fleishman, advocate the
use of public subsidies as a means of insuring that competent candidates will have a floor
of funds from which to run a legitimate campaign. See generally Fleishman & McCorkle,
supra note 113, at 294 ("A Level-Up campaign finance system should therefore contrib-
ute to a more competitive and pluralistic political process.").
As a policy matter, the public financing provisions advocated by those like Senator
Mathias may contain substantial problems, including the concern with having partisan
incumbents controlling the amount and timing of the public funds. See Polsby, supra
note 7, at 31-41, 42 ("Public financing of elections ... carries serious dangers of excessive
entanglement of existing government in the process of choosing new elective officials and
the undue domination of the process by people with a personal stake in an election's
outcome."). An example of this concern occurred in 1976, when Congress was faced with
the task of reconstituting the Federal Election Commission. Despite a mandate from the
Supreme Court to pass a bill within thirty days, Congress took more than 100 days to do
so, during which time several important primary campaigns had passed, and several can-
didates had been forced to drop out of the race or to reduce campaign activities severely
because of their inability to receive the public funds they had expected. See Polsby, supra
note 7, at 35-38. This type of activity might support the concern that we should strive for
a campaign system with a minimum of legislative interference with the operations of the
political marketplace. See J. Ely, supra note 38.
In addition, public funding of political campaigns might be seen as a direct infringe-
ment on political liberty, as the first amendment also ensures citizens the right not to
speak in political campaigns. Cf Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977) (the state
cannot require an individual "to participate in the dissemination of an ideological
message... ."). The Supreme Court addressed some of these concerns in Buckley, where
it allowed public funding of presidential campaigns. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16
(1976) (per curiam). The presidential campaigns are financed from a voluntary tax
check-off fund, which would seem to minimize the coercion problems. As Professor
Jacobson points out, however, revenues lost through the voluntary check-off must be
made up by other taxpayers. See G. Jacobson, supra note 59, at 203. A proposal for full
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Lifting the limits on the ability of parties to spend in congressional
campaigns simultaneously will strengthen the party organizations and di-
minish the impact of PACs. Allowing increased support from parties
will reduce the almost necessary reliance of candidates on PAC funds
and strengthen the parties so that they can better fulfill their role in
American politics.3 49 As the amount of money contributed by PACs
continues to rise, limitations on party contributions become less feasible,
as parties should be given the opportunity to match the unlimited total
contributions that PACs can make.
CONCLUSION
Despite the extensive litigation fostered by FECA and the significant
limitations that the 1974 Act imposes on political party participation in
campaigns, the parties have not participated significantly in the court
challenges to date. While political parties probably represent the most
successful fund-raising players within FECA's system, the parties have
not taken advantage of the Supreme Court's apparent distaste for cam-
paign limitations to challenge the laws restricting their ability to support
party candidates. Hence, many of the constitutional concerns regarding
party involvement in campaigns have not yet been addressed.
The parties' failure to challenge FECA as it applies to them is inexplic-
public financing of congressional campaigns would increase substantially the amount of
funds required, and a public financing program financed directly through the federal
budget might not meet with Supreme Court approval.
Another major problem with public financing as the proposals have presented it is that
these proposals dictate spending limitations for congressional races. These limitations
would have a tendency to increase incumbents' protection, as challengers often need to
spend larger amounts of money to reach the name recognition of incumbents and to
overcome the beneficial aspects of the office resources received by congressmen as a part
of the congressional office. The political value in a campaign of the perquisites of con-
gressional incumbency is extensive. Congressional incumbents receive numerous perqui-
sites of office, including substantial allowances for staff, offices, congressional franking,
low-cost television and radio production. For perquisites of congressional offices, see 2
U.S.C. § 46g (1982) (telephone and telegraph expenses); 2 U.S.C. §§ 57-58 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986) (House and Senate allowances for office space, travel, office supplies, etc.); 2
U.S.C. § 332 (1982) (allowances for staff). In 1982, Congressmen were allowed $352,536
for office staff and up to $256,700 in transportation costs, telecommunication costs, and
office space costs. See N. Ornstein, T. Mann, M. Malbin, J. Bibby, Vital Statistics on
Congress, 1982, 121, Table 5-12. In the same year, senators received up to $1,247,879 for
"clerk hire," and an additional $192,624 for "legislative assistance." Id. at 123, Table 5-
13. Senators additionally were provided up to $143,000 on an office expense account, and
allotted up to 8,000 square feet in office space. Id In addition, the incumbent usually has
a significant advantage in terms of an ability to use her political office to generate free
publicity during the course of a campaign.
The level-up subsidies advocated by Professor Fleishman remove some of these con-
cerns but do not seem to be the most effective means of solving these problems. Equality
of spending can be better achieved by permitting greater allowances for party spending.
349. See Adamany, PAC's and the Democratic Financing of Politics, 22 Ariz. L Rev.
569, 597-602 (1980); Alexander, The Future of Election Reform, 10 Hastings Const. LQ.
721, 736 (1983); L. Sabato, supra note 251, at 176-77. The role of PACs has been a
primary focus of congressional debate in recent years. See supra note 29.
1987]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
able, as valid grounds exist under the admittedly inconsistent Supreme
Court jurisprudence in the campaign finance area to justify a constitu-
tional challenge. If the parties challenge the limits on party spending as
they now stand, the Supreme Court should find that these limits signifi-
cantly infringe upon the first amendment rights of political parties and
therefore violate the Constitution. Simply put, political parties do not
present the threat of corruption that the Court has sanctioned as the only
acceptable justification for limiting first amendment rights in the cam-
paign context. The parties, therefore, can be distinguished from special
interest groups also participating in the political process.
In addition, a challenge to the election laws by the parties would allow
the Supreme Court to reaffirm first amendment principles. This, in turn,
would add a feature to the finance system that would promote the overall
goals of the campaign finance system designed by Congress: a decision
removing limitations on party spending would allow parties to provide a
base of funds for candidates, without bringing on the threats of corrup-
tion that Congress fears.
The Court, for the most part, has failed to address the campaign fi-
nance laws as an integrated scheme. It has, instead, addressed the consti-
tutional claims step-by-step, without considering the impact of its
decisions on the integrated system designed by Congress. By lifting the
limitations on a party's ability to assist its candidates in federal cam-
paigns, the Supreme Court can take a giant step toward minimizing the
incongruities it has left by its previous campaign finance decisions. In-
creasing the role of the parties in the finance structure, either through
constitutional challenge or congressional action, would result in a system
that effectively embodies many of the good intentions demonstrated by
Congress in enacting the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments
of 1974.
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